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ABSTRACT
Woodrow W ilson’s Principled Preaching
On U. S. Foreign Policy, 1913-1917
by
Roger E. Carey
Dr. Joseph A. Fry, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Woodrow Wilson based his ideals and actions as president on principles shaped by
his religious beliefs. While Wilson scholars have examined his idealism, few have traced
the religious roots of the principles that formed his ideology. During the period of
American neutrality from 1914 to 1917, he made numerous public speeches that afford
insight into his religious beliefs, their relationship to his understanding of presidential
leadership, good government, and especially foreign policy. Wilson believed that good
leaders used oratory to inform the people of important issues and guide them to support
the best policies. His speeches reflect what he thought the public needed to know to
approve his plans and undertakings and the concepts he used to gain that approval. Thus,
the speeches provide unique insight into how Woodrow Wilson justified U.S. foreign
policies and actions.
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INTRODUCTION
Historians have analyzed Woodrow W ilson’s foreign policy decisions, and the basis
for those decisions, for more than eight decades. Although he had an almost exclusively
domestic focus at the beginning of his presidency, Wilson guided the United States
through one of only two wars termed “W orld” in its scope. His diplomatic actions in
Mexico, Haiti, and other areas, his pursuit of neutrality with Europe, his actions during
World War I, and his postwar peace negotiations in Paris make him one of the most
active foreign relations presidents on record. Depending on the historical school
analyzing his policies, Wilson ranged from the man who defined twentieth century
foreign policy to the planter of the seeds of its destruction.
Recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of ideology in understanding U.S.
foreign relations. While Wilson scholars have examined his idealism, few have traced
the religious roots of the principles that formed his ideology. During the period of
American neutrality from 1914 to 1917, he made numerous public speeches that afford
insight into his religious beliefs, their relationship to his understanding of presidential
leadership, good government, and especially foreign policy. Wilson believed that good
leaders used oratory to inform the people of important issues and guide them to support
the best policies. As the importance of the issue or policy at stake rose, so did the
importance of speaking on it. W ilson’s speeches reflect what he thought the public
needed to know to approve his plans and undertakings, and the concepts he used to gain
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that approval. Thus, the speeches provide unique insight into how he justified U.S.
policies and actions.
The main thesis of this study is Woodrow Wilson based his beliefs and actions as
president on principles shaped by his religious beliefs. His oratorical efforts to inform
and persuade revealed the religious character of W ilson’s principles. When discrepancies
between his speeches and other sources appear, periodic analysis is provided and
resolution attempted, but my main goal is to recount his views as he conceived and
expressed them. To examine W ilson’s actions and how they compare to his professed
motives would require a study of his private communications, the writings of individuals
involved with Wilson and U.S. policy at the time, various records of U.S. actions in the
time period, and other materials beyond the scope of this study. The focus is W ilson’s
public expressions in his speeches of his principles and the religious basis for them as
they relate to U.S. foreign policy.
The first chapter begins by exploring the impact W ilson’s family and upbringing had
on his religious education. His minister father significantly shaped his worldview and
stimulated Woodrow to oratorical excellence. As an adult, Wilson maintained a
Protestant Christian faith that closely linked belief with aetion. He thought of service to
America as a religious obligation. When he applied these concepts to foreign relations,
Wilson found that good leaders needed religious faith, and served by bring the country,
and by extension the world, closer to God. Persuasive oratory provided the leader with a
method to guide people to the goal. Directed by the president, the nation could fulfill its
divine duty to spread the blessings of American-style democracy to the world. Thus,

V ll
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American policy and actions by definition benefited any recipient nation. Wilson cited
American actions as proof of this benevolence.
In the second and third chapters, the focus shifts to W ilson’s public speeches from the
first inaugural address to his call for war with Germany, centering on those principles he
considered foundational and how he applied them in foreign policy. He stressed
neutrality as a means to a mediated peace, and peace as a prerequisite to elevating the
nations to God, the divine purpose and goal of America. Changes brought about by the
European war required an organization to preserve peace and protect the rights of men.
Wilson presented his version of preparedness as a means to ensure the protection of the
United States as it pursued its God-given duty. As the period of neutrality ended in 1917,
W ilson’s speeches continued to reflect his dependence on religiously based principles,
and even in his call to war, those ideals dominated his thoughts.

vm
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CHAPTER 1

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AS A SOURCE OF PRINCIPLES
W ilson’s father, the Rev. Dr. Joseph Ruggles Wilson, was the most signifieant early
influence in his life. From his father, Wilson learned the religious teachings that formed
the foundation of his life. He also reeeived significant encouragement in writing and
speaking that continued until his father’s death. W ilson’s religious beliefs reflected a
particular stream of religious thought that prompted him to action, and carried profound
implications for the United States. He thought that visionary realists with unconquerable
confidence based on Divine Providence made good leaders, that the power of the
president reigned supreme in foreign relations, that an educated and informed minority
ruling for the majority led to the best government, and that America’s destiny was to lead
the world to a democratic form of government which he closely linked to conversion to
Christianity. These components of W ilson’s personal ideology were rooted in his
religious beliefs: the essential goodness and perfectibility of man, God’s special choosing
of and destiny for America, the necessity of religious service as a sign of belief, and the
linking of personal and national salvation.

Family Influence and Upbringing
Woodrow Wilson was born with a heritage of Presbyterian ministers on both sides of
the family. Dr. Joseph Wilson, W oodrow’s father, was an ordained minister in the

1
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Presbyterian Church. After moving to the antebellum South in pursuit of teaching
opportunities and as a Southern sympathizer, Dr. Wilson helped form the Presbyterian
Church in the United States (the Southern branch of the Presbyterian church). Appointed
to the position of Stated Clerk, he served with distinction from 1865 to 1898. The office
of Stated Clerk is the highest-ranking permanent job in the Presbyterian system. This
individual is responsible for the daily operation of denominational affairs whenever the
various graded courts are not meeting. The Clerk preserves and organizes all official
paperwork from all over the denomination and, depending on the sect, can be responsible
for denominational publishing concerns, and receipt and delivery of monies for mission
work both at home and abroad. Only significant and respected members of the
denomination are selected for this task.
Joseph Wilson also spent time at Columbia, South Carolina, as a seminary professor
before moving on to other pastorates. Woodrow Wilson grew up in an atmosphere of
significant religiosity, where Christianity was real and observation of Presbyterian
distinctives a regular part of life. Woodrow Wilson saw this as the core foundational
experience of his life, and relished, “the unspeakable joy of having been born and bred in
a minister’s family.” ^
An episode from his uncle James W oodrow’s life is instructive to further grasp the
specific nature of the Presbyterianism of W ilson’s boyhood environment. Dr. James
Woodrow was a professor of natural science appointed to a chair at Columbia

' Arthur S. Link, David W. Hirst, John E. Little, et al, eds.. Papers of Woodrow W ilson. 69 vol., (Princeton,
NJ; Princeton University Press, 1966-1993), Volume 16, page 350. Hereinafter PWW and cited as 16:350.
The standard work on W ilson’s youth, education, and development before his political career is John M.
Mulder. Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).
M ulder’s work and several essays by Link constitute the major, recent scholarship on W ilson’s religious
views.
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Theological Seminary designed to demonstrate the lack of conflict in religion and
science. In 1884, he published an endorsement of theistie evolution, whieh drew a
frenzied response. The Seminary dismissed Dr. Woodrow from his position, although an
ecelesiastieal trial acquitted him of heresy eharges." Dr. Woodrow admitted to differing
with traditional interpretations of the Bible and the Westminster Confession of Faith.^
Both Joseph and Woodrow Wilson fervently baeked Dr. Woodrow, not merely beeause
he was family, but beeause they agreed with his theology.
Woodrow W ilson’s spécifié theologieal views best fit that division of U.S.
Presbyterianism called New School. American Presbyterianism split in 1837 over
doctrinal issues. These issues entered the Presbyterian Chureh in 1801 when the Plan of
Union allowed Congregational and Presbyterian ehurehes to exchange pastors and plant
ehurches on the frontier. The Congregationalists brought with them a system of doctrine
ealled New England Theology, which they derived from Jonathan Edwards. This system
differed from traditional Calvinism at some points, but not all. Many of those who
argued for the New Measures of Charles G. Finney found affinity with the
Congregationalists. The resultant blend of theologians and pastors, referred to as New
School Presbyterians, split from the more orthodox Presbyterians, termed Old Sehool.
The Civil War served as a unifying call in the South between the two groups, particularly
since the New Sehool had made few inroads there. The Northern Presbyterian divisions
reunited between 1868 and 1870, but unlike the southern ehurch. New Sehoolers
remained a signifieant force. Both Northern and Southern ehurehes shifted in a more

^ A.H. Freundt Jr., “James W oodrow” in Dictionary of the Presbyterian & Reformed Tradition in America.
D.G. Hart and Mark A. Noll, eds., (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 279-280; Franklin
Steiner, The Religious Beliefs of Our Presidents: From W ashington to F.D.R.. (Amherst, NY :
Prometheus Books, 1995), 51.
^ A sub-biblical doctrinal standard for Presbyterians.
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liberal, less orthodox direction, with the North about forty years ahead of the South due
in part to the greater degree of New School influence."^
The New Sehool’s freedom from a strict orthodoxy, and affinity with social justice
and progressive ideals, better fit the Presbyterianism of Woodrow Wilson, despite the
lack of New Sehool influence in the South. As a ruling elder in the Northern
Presbyterian Church, Wilson was exposed to New Sehool ideas. In any event. Dr.
W ilson’s influence on his son was not limited to religion. Father also influenced son
significantly in the realms of writing and speaking.
Historians have debated the nature of the relationship between the younger Woodrow
Wilson and his father.^ While some have cited evidence of a loving relationship, and
others a struggle filled resentful interaction, nearly all agree Joseph R. Wilson exerted a
tremendous formative influence on Woodrow. Early letters from Dr. Wilson to young
Woodrow expressed growing approval of W oodrow’s writing skills, ineluding specific
types of adviee to follow when writing, that young Woodrow eondensed and rewrote to
preserve for future use. W oodrow’s innate abilities prompted his father to write in 1878
that the fault would be W oodrow’s if he did not beeome a great writer.® As W oodrow’s
writing matured, he and his father offered eaeh other compositional aid. By 1884, Dr.
Wilson was asking his son’s assistance in drafting an important address. This interaction

David B. Calhoun, Princeton Seminarv. Vol. 1, Faith and Learning 1812-1868. (Carlisle, PA: The Banner
of Truth Trust, 1996), 213-219.
^ See Sigmund Freud and W illiam C. Bullitt, Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study. (Boston,
MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), 6-10, 54-66, 94, 104-105; Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George,
W oodrow W ilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study. (New York, NY: John Day, 1956), 3-14;
Mulder, Preparation, especially 29-85; and Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters.
Volume 1, “Youth” (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Co, 1927-39) 1-107. Curiously, Link’s fivevolume biography does not deal with the father-son relationship.
®Joseph R. W ilson to Woodrow W ilson, Oct. 24, 1878, PWW. 1:422. Hereinafter JRW and WW.
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continued until Dr. W ilson’s death in 1903, and Woodrow depended on it as a tool to
continually sharpen his writing abilities.’
Joseph Wilson exerted a significant influence in W oodrow’s life in other areas, such
as early encouragement for his son to develop oratorical expertise. He recommended that
Woodrow base all oratory on a foundation of truth that listeners could understand,
foeusing on his extemporaneous skills. When Woodrow’s speeches received good
reviews, his father wrote or spoke of his joy at W oodrow’s oratorical success.^ In
addition to a devotion to the well-spoken word, the two men shared struggles with
depression, and Woodrow learned from his father both his work ethie and a tendency
toward painstaking self-denial.^ His father’s influence shaped much of W oodrow’s early
views and ideas.’®

Adult Religious Beliefs
Woodrow Wilson embraced the religion of his parents and upbringing as an adult.
His religious thought ean be divided into two major eategories: his beliefs about specific
theological issues, and his sense of the implications of religious beliefs. W ilson’s views
on two theological topics, human nature and Providenee, illustrate his general orientation.
Traditional Presbyterians maintained that man, beeause of Adam’s fall in the Garden of
Eden, possessed a nature inelined to evil. Thus, whenever offered a choice, man would
choose evil over good. Wilson disagreed and viewed people as essentially good by
nature, an idea more eonsistent with his endorsement of evolutionary thought and the

’ JRW to WW, December 17, 1884, PWW. 3:549; Interview by Ida Minerva Tarbell, December 3, 1916,
PWW. 16:325.
**JRW to WW, October 19, 1878, PWW. 1:421.
®JRW to WW, January 25, 1878, PWW. 1:346.
Mulder, Preparation. 29.
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New School Presbyterianism of his adulthood. While delivering his speech “Democracy”
in 1891, he summarized his belief in humanity’s essential goodness by describing
Americans as honest, sincere, and wise.”
Wilson agreed with much of the orthodox Presbyterian position concerning
Providence. The Westminster Confession of Faith stated that God’s ordering of all
events established the legitimacy of secondary causes, such as men’s actions. At the
same time, men were responsible for their aetions.’^ Wilson argued in “Government by
Debate” that Providence blesses a country, but man could curse a eountry. While he had
complete faith in Providence’s ordering of events, the necessity of man doing his duty
was the wisest way to proeeed. Every man had the duty to be saved, and thereby link
himself to the plans of Providence.’^ In describing such a role for Providence, W ilson’s
understanding reflected the Old School environment of his youth.
The support of both orthodox and unorthodox positions in his personal system was
not lost on Wilson. As he explained it, “Unorthodox in my reading of the standards of
the faith, I am nevertheless orthodox in my faith.” ’"’ The flexibility in theology necessary
for Wilson to be a Presbyterian is more eonsistent with a New School construct, rather
than the traditional, rigidly orthodox Old School position. The implications of his
theology also fit the active-in-the-world focus of the New School rather than the spiritual
emphasis of the Old. Wilson found two specific implications in his religion; it required
action, and it was linked to the nation.

" “Democracy,” December 5, 1891. PWW. 7:356.
W estminster Confession of Faith. (Glasgow, Scotland: Free Presbyterian Publications, 1988), 33-38.
“Government by Debate,” December 4, 1882, PWW. 2:254.
W W Journal entry, December 28, 1889, PWW. 6:462.
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For Wilson religion without action was unthinkable. Anyone doing any job anywhere
needed to have the attitude that religion encompassed all work. This attitude was a goal
for which Christians should strive. A job in the public eye carried even greater
obligations. Others could see the obedience of the worker and glorify God as a result.
Wilson linked a good providential outcome to the performance of duty. Action was
evidence of religious faith; therefore, not only pleasing God, but also salvific status was
action based. W ilson’s Christianity had service for the sake of the love of God as a
motive to do right. The desire to action was consistent with orthodox Presbyterianism,
which taught the actions of spreading the faith and perfecting oneself through increasing
obedience to the law of God were duties of every Christian. Wilson took this teaching a
step further in two different directions. First, he extended perfection of self beyond
Presbyterian norms. As a rule, Presbyterians taught that perfection increased throughout
one’s lifetime, without ever reaching total perfection, much like the concept o f a limit in
calculus. Holiness / Methodist groups espoused a specific event in the Christian’s life
after which the person had achieved perfection. However, it was possible to lose this
perfection. Presbyterians emphasized the effort / journey, while Holiness / Methodists
emphasized the goal. Wilson in an address at Oberlin College, one o f the homes of the
Holiness / Methodist view, emphasized the need to pursue the goal of Christian
perfection. As with most religious concepts, Wilson saw this as an action. The scope of
this action was the second different direction Wilson pursued: the reason for this pursuit
of perfection was to make America’s thoughts Christian, and the thoughts of the world
America’s thoughts.’®

News report of an address on “Americanism” at Oberlin College, March 22, 1906, PWW. 16:341.
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The idea of Christianity and America as somehow linked, or that Christians had some
unique or specific goal for America was hardly a new concept with Wilson. He linked
the church and society, holding that while the church’s main job was to save souls, its
secondary job was purification of society. The church could accomplish this goal not by
organizing against vices, or forcing good behavior by eliminating sources of temptation
to bad behavior, but by “kindling light in which no vice can live.” '® By this method, love
transformed the poor and vicious members of society, leading Wilson to conclude,
“Individual salvation is national salvation.” ”
In the process of linking the church and society, Wilson saw the strongest parallel
with religion in patriotism. He thought that every man should be a religious man, and the
duty of the religious man was patriotism. Thus, for Wilson the religious man’s motives
were socialized in working for the country. Wilson linked love of God and service to
men, especially service in the form of service to the country. The sense of duty that
patriotism embodied concerned itself with the improvement of society by focusing on
service to that which is greater than man, much in the same way religion concentrated on
service to God, who is higher than man. In both situations, raising up others along with
the individual was the highest good. For Wilson, service to God in religion and service to
country in patriotism were virtually indistinguishable."'

Leadership and Democracy
W ilson’s philosophy concerning the nation was not restricted to specifically religious
issues. He developed during his teaching career specific ideas about the nature of
Notes for a religious address, January 17, 1900, PWW. 11:376-377.
Notes for a religious address, March 28, 1897, PWW. 10:198. [Italics in the original.
“Religion and Patriotism,” July 4, 1902, PWW, 12:474-476.
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leadership and the details concerning how government operated. His view of government
was based in religion. A statesman needed to have biblical faith in order to tell the truth
in public service. Otherwise, the statesman would lie, since neutrality did not exist.'®
Wilson saw the goals of political and individual development as synonymous; to move
toward a relationship with God. In society, this was accomplished by the triumph of
reason over passion, of slow resolutions based on consideration of choices, rather than
crude, hasty, or reactionary action.^® Government work, like all work, served God. The
men who best served God were those men with an unconquerable confidence based on
Divine Providence. To resist such men was foolish, not only because all the might and
power of God was behind them, but because in men who were rendered greater than the
world around them could be found the salvation of church, community, and state.^'
Aside from the religious qualifications, Wilson had specific ideas about what kind of
men made good leaders, and how they led. He contrasted the leader and the literary man.
A good literary man was an idealist, a man unable to deal well with the pragmatic
concerns of reality. A good leader, by contrast was a realist, concerned with pragmatic
accomplishment. Thus, a good literary man would make a bad leader, and vice versa. It
is ironic that an obviously literary man, who historians describe as the supreme U.S.
idealist in the twentieth century, finds the idealist to be a poor leader, while undoubtedly
viewing his own record as one of superb leadership! For Wilson a leader was a visionary
who saw only his own vision, and no others. Such a perspective allowed the leader to
remain free from distractions that could impede the carrying out of the leader’s vision.

“A Christian Statesman,” September 5, 1876, PWW. 1:188-189.
^ “A Treatise on the M odern Democratic State,” December 1, 1885, PWW. 5:90.
Religious address at Trenton, NJ, October 23, 1912, PWW. 25:456.
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Vision of this type emboldened a leader, and a free nation loved a bold man who
vigorously pursued what he thought and s a id /’
To Wilson, how a leader led was at least as important as the kind of man leading.
Political leadership was leadership in conduct. Those who observed the right conduct of
leaders glorified God, a desirable outcome given W ilson’s religious convictions. As
would be expected from his father’s influence, Wilson deemed communication of
primary importance. Self-governance occurred via public speech. Those who ruled in
democracies did so by reasonable persuasion. Thus, Wilson thought orators necessary for
self-government.” The content of these orations was simple, and the thoughts and ideas
direct. Wilson asserted the morality aimed at by the speaker should be large and obvious,
without subtle meanings or hints. New information was detrimental to the speaker’s
cause. What the public already knew, perhaps stated slightly differently, was best.
""Persuasion is a force, but not information; and persuasion is accomplished by creeping
into the confidence of those you would lead.”” In order to change the mind of the
public, a leader had to give many speeches over an extended period.
Wilson examined a spécifié leader, the President, in some detail. He compared the
early days of the republic with his own time, and concluded that when foreign relations
issues became leading questions of the day, the President of necessity became the
^ “Democracy,” December 5, 1891, PWW. 7:360-361. For historical analysis critical of W ilson as an
idealist, see Lloyd Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism
during W orld W ar I. (Wilmington. DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc, 1991), 1-66. For a more positive
appraisal of W ilson’s idealism, see John Milton Cooper, Jr., The W arrior and the Priest: W oodrow Wilson
and Theodore Roosevelt. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1983), 260261, 271, 307, 310, 314, 337; and Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the W orldwide
Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 102-109.
For an attempt to merge the two perspectives, see Arthur S. Link “The Higher Realism of Woodrow
W ilson,” in The Higher Realism of W oodrow Wilson and Other Essays. (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt
University Press, 1971), 127-139.
^ ’’Government by Debate,” December 4, 1882, PWW. 2:270.
Commencement address “Leaders of M en” at University o f Tennessee, Knoxville, June 17, 1890, PWW,
6:652. [Italics in the original.]
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nation’s leader. With the shift in national perspective due to the Spanish-CubanAmerican War, any new situation requiring foreign policy would require leadership that
only the executive branch could provide. The President was the master of the United
States and ruled America, and thereby determined a large part of the destiny of the world.
According to Wilson, the nation before 1898 had been domestically focused and
incapable of foreign relations in any significant international sense. That situation
changed permanently in 1898. The office of President, as it had developed historically,
did not require actual experience, Wilson argued, as much as a character and qualities of
mind that the country desired in its government. The power of the President in foreign
affairs had few checks or balances. Only the Senate had any input through its yes / no
vote on treaties, and even then the president shaped the treaties. Therefore, the President
had control, and the government in foreign affairs had to follow his lead. “He need
disclose no step of negotiation until it is complete, and when in any critical matter it is
completed the government is virtually committed. Whatever its disinclination, the Senate
may feel itself committed also.”’® If the Senate, or any other specific group or special
interest, approached the President on an issue, their voices were not the voices to which a
President should listen. Wilson thought that the President must listen to and focus on the
voice of the great masses to lead and serve them. If he did not, a President would face
universal criticism and discontent.’®
For Wilson, listening to the voice of the masses did not mean the masses governed, or
decisively influenced government. He thought the masses had little to do with formal
governance. Majorities in fact ruled nothing. The minority in power manipulated
^ “W hat is Constitutional Government?” March 24, 1908, PWW. 18:120.
^ Address to the Periodical Publishers Association of America in Philadelphia, February 2, 1912, PWW,
24:129.
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majorities. This process meant that men were essentially clay in the hands of the leaders,
and correlated with W ilson’s understanding that the minority used gradual persuasion to
gain the confidence of the masses.” Based on this analysis of the masses, government
came from the small groups of men in power. The difference between the majority and
the minority, other than size, was that the small groups knew how to govern, and the
average man did not. If progress was slow, it resulted from the need to yield to too many
less-capable people. In light of these restrictions, the goal in politics was to accomplish
the practical.’^ Wilson held that reform would fail if the nation was unprepared. To
make reform practical required persuading the majority to follow the minority’s changes.
Listening to the voice of the masses equipped a leader to communicate the direction in
which the majority needed to move. Leadership committed to a cause that operated in
this fashion would not compromise the practical requirements needed to accomplish
reform.’®
Wilson also devoted significant attention to the formation of democracies.’® He saw
democracy thriving, and on the cusp of prevailing, all over the globe. This tendency
toward a common type of government, the American type, demonstrated for Wilson the

Commencement address “Leaders of Men” at University o f Tennessee, Knoxville, June 17, 1890, PWW,
6:650.
“Patriotism,” W orchester, MA, January 30, 1902, PWW, 12:263; WW to Allen W ickham Corwin,
September 10, 1900, PWW. 11:573.
Commencement address “Leaders of Men” at University of Tennessee, Knoxville, June 17, 1890, PWW.
6:659, 663.
Viewpoints vary concerning what Wilson attempted to accomplish and what he actually did. For several
perspectives, see Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American
Foreign Relations. (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002); Lloyd C. Gardner, Safe for Democracv:
The Anglo-American Response to Revolution. 1913-1923. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
1984); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and W orld Politics: America’s Response to W ar and
Revolution. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1968); Arthur S. Link, W ilson The Diplomatist: A
Look at His M ajor Foreign Policies. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957); Thomas J. Knock, To
End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Ouest for a New World Order. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1992); Amos Pearlmutter, Making the World Safe for Democracv: A Century of
Wilsonianism and Its Totalitarian Challengers. (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press,
1997); and Tony Smith, A merica’s M ission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13

inherent superiority of the American system. Democracy’s future depended on the
presence of both local liberty and international federation, with the proviso that local
liberty was required first. Liberty required law. Wilson held that law contained and
placed boundaries on liberty which enabled liberty to function, in much the same way
that the boundary of the engine allowed steam to function. In addition to law, democracy
needed unfettered public opinion. He believed that an important difference between a
free and unfree government was the authority of public opinion. If both law and public
opinion played appropriate roles, liberty emerged and democratic self-government
developed.” Two other requirements existed in W ilson’s mind for the formation of
democracies. First, active pursuit of obedience to the law of liberty, or law of service and
order, was required. A democracy was not a thing of being, but of doing. Just as religion
required action, so did formation of governments. Wilson thought that a good
providential outcome, democracy, was linked to deeds. Second, democracies required a
long span of time to form correctly. A state could not safely develop by revolution. He
thought that self-government was not a gift. A group of people earned it over a long
period of obedience to those in authority, during which a community formed under just
laws and sympathetic administration.”
Although Wilson preferred persuasion to further the development of democracy, he
recognized that force was necessary on occasion. While war was inherently neither noble
nor admirable, Wilson admitted that the cause or causes of a war could be noble or
admirable. Likewise, he thought while wars were bad for the economy, there was no
more glorious way to die. The crux of the matter for Wilson was the cause of the fight.
W oodrow Wilson, The State. (Boston, MA: D.C. Heath & Co., Publishers, 1903), 581; “The Art of
Governing,” November 15, 1885, PWW. 5:53; “Democracy,” December 5, 1891, PWW. 7:364.
32
‘Democracy,” December 5, 1891, PWW. 7: 365, 358; “Constitutional Government,” PWW 18: 104.
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If the cause were a good and worthwhile one, then Wilson would fight. Once the cause
in Europe after 1914 was clear, the duty of the United States would be clear as well. He
wanted the United States to have a reputation for icy cold mastery of self-control,
reasoning that this type of enemy was the most feared. For Wilson, the use of force was a
last resort, used when all other options had been exhausted. Even then, America would
not act as an aggressor, but to contain aggression. Wilson viewed America’s history as
fighting repeatedly for the rights of humanity. Thus, Wilson approved of a “right vs.
wrong” war, in which neutrality was impossible, and all of mankind united against an
abuser of human rights.”
Wilson linked his support of democracy to his view of America’s future. He held
unquestioningly to the concept of a guardian destiny for America, a concept consistent
with his understanding of Divine Providence. Wilson stated his view of America’s
destiny at a young people’s religious meeting in 1905: “ ... [the] mighty task before
us...is to make the United States a mighty Christian nation, and christianize the world.””
Seven years later during a campaign speech he asserted that God had at the country’s
inception implanted visions of liberty, and the task of the United States was to show other
nations how to “walk in the paths of liberty.”’® Wilson based his views of America,
democracy, governing, and leadership on religion, specifically Protestant Christianity.

Speech accepting a Statue of Philip Kearny, November 11, 1914, PWW. 31:561; Diary o f Colonel
House, February 14, 1913, PWW. 27:113; Remarks to the Associated Press in New York, April 20, 1915,
PWW. 33:40; Notification to Powers, January 31, 1914, PWW. 29:207; Campaign address in Buffalo, NY,
November 11, 1916, PWW. 38:588; Non-partisan address in Cincinnati, October 26, 19166, PWW, 38:541.
^ Speech at a young people’s religious meeting, November 20, 1905, PWW. 16:228.
Campaign address in Jersey City, NJ, May 25, 1912, PWW, 24:443.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15

Pre-Presidential Foreign Policy Views
Wilson used his personal ideology in formulating specific foreign policy perspectives
before his presidency. Examining the relationship of the United States with France and
Great Britain during George W ashington’s presidency, Wilson asserted that the correct
view, the view of neutrality, prevailed only because Washington held the standard high
enough for all to see.’® W ilson’s analysis of W ashington’s action indicated his belief in
the necessity of persuading the majority. When he explored the acquisition of Texas,
Wilson criticized the secret negotiations involved. As he assessed the Mexican War,
Wilson condemned U.S. tactics and foreign policy, calling President Polk’s foreign
policy “ruthless aggrandizement” and foreshadowing his reluctance to intervene in
Mexico during his first term as president.” Wilson approved Grover Cleveland’s policy
regarding Hawaii, citing Cleveland’s “rare courage.” Cleveland had resisted pressure to
annex Hawaii from imperialistic-minded members of the foreign policy public and
opposed the acquisition of colonies. Reflecting his understanding of the importance o f a
leader’s communication, Wilson criticized Cleveland for bluntly speaking his mind and
holding nothing back during the crisis with Great Britain over the eastern boundary of
Venezuela.’^
Wilson decided as early as 1891 that America’s future lay in interaction with the
international community, not in the relative isolation of earlier years. After the SpanishCuban-American War, he argued the United States could no longer remain provincial in
world affairs. Involvement in international affairs would subject America to criticism

Woodrow Wilson, George W ashington. (New York: Frederick Ungar reprint 1963, originally printed
1896 ), 2 96 .

Woodrow Wilson, Division and Reunion: 1829 - 1889. (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897),
149-154.
“Mr. Cleveland as President,” January 15, 1897, PWW. 10:102-119.
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without regard for how such commentary affected American sensibilities. He thought
that all would be well if the U.S. government remained open and free rather than
secretive in the face of criticism, since only pent up forces caused damage. W ith such a
government, the United States could enjoy success in post-war dependencies like the
Philippines, if it withstood international criticism. Agreeing with his friend Fredrick
Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis, Wilson believed that 1898 had marked the end of a
domestic era. As he reminded his audience at the New York Democratic Club in early
1912, events of 1898 marked the shift of the United States to committed international
participation. In light of these changes, the best U.S. policy avoided any return to pre1898 foreign relations.
Immediately after the fighting stopped in the Spanish-Cuban-American War, Wilson
assessed the whole affair. He was convinced that the United States fought for ideological
reasons, that America had become involved due to outrage as the country witnessed
transgressions of American ideals in Cuba. Concerning the speed and timing of U.S.
involvement, Wilson suggested that a calm, slow assessment of the situation would have
been best, and that U.S. actions were justified, but hasty. Two years later he had changed
his mind, arguing that the United States actually had proceeded deliberately, not rushing
to war despite an appearance of haste. He considered the war a just one, proof that
America was not merely a group of warmongers. Finally, he suggested that the world
was transformed, since the United States now participated in a part of the global
competition to possess the world. This competition to possess the world raised the

“Democracy,” December 5, 1891. PWW. 7:348: Newspaper report of speech “Liberty and its uses” in
Brooklyn, NY, January 14, 1900, PWW. 11:374-375; Address on the Tariff to New York Democratic Club,
January 3, 1912, PWW. 23:641; W illiam Appleman W illiams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. (New
York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959), 71.
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question of what to do next with the territory gained, a question Wilson deemed primarily
moral. He later concluded that Providence had willed the change in America at the time
of the Spanish-Cuban-American War. The war had been “a war of impulse,” not in the
sense of a hasty decision, but a war for which the United States was unprepared. Wilson
concluded that U.S. motives in both Cuba and the Philippines were the same: to serve
both countries by showing them the way to liberty.'^^
Wilson did not initially favor taking the Philippines, but once annexed, the islands not
only constituted a place to advance liberty, they also provided an opportunity for hotblooded young men to serve their country."^' He held that the Philippines should be
granted self-government, but only when they were ready. If the Filipinos accepted U.S.
governmental standards, then America would collaborate with them. The motive
prompting the United States to acquire the Philippines was the same impulse that had led
to expansion in Louisiana, although Wilson thought the types of expansion - intra vs.
inter continental - were different. In 1904, a group favoring Filipino independence
attempted to gain W ilson’s support. He replied that insufficient time had passed for the
Filipinos to learn the lessons of democracy from those Americans among them, and he
refused to have his name associated with an anti-imperialist league/^

"***Woodrow Wilson, A History of the American People. (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1901),
Vol. 10, p. 161; Memorandum “W hat Ought W e To Do,” August 1, 1898, PWW 10:574-576; Political
essay “Democracy and Efficiency,” October 1, 1900, PWW. 12:18; “Statesmanship of Letters,” November
5, 1903. PWW. 15:41.
For an interesting analysis of the “hot blooded” concept Wilson referred to, see Kristin L. Hoganson’s
Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and PhilippineAmerican Wars. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998) 9, 158
Report of a speech on “Patriotism” in Waterbury, CT, December 14, 1899, PWW. 11:298-299;
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Wilson envisioned the U.S. role in the Philippines as one of direct involvement
leading to the development of Filipino self-government. In China, Wilson thought the
United States had the same role to play, but in an indirect manner. He perceived America
acting when no one else would to maintain an open door in Manchuria. Wilson saw
similarities in Panama and Puerto Rico. The Louisiana impulse applied in Puerto Rico,
and America could guide the island to self-government just as it was doing with the
Philippines. In general, Wilson considered the activity in these countries the natural
result of the closing of the frontier. The consequent expansion of the United States
outside the continental United States meant America could continue as it had before the
frontier closed, because to Wilson American expansion was axiomatic. Moreover, when
he considered the beneficial effects of spreading American democracy, Wilson viewed
the United States and its influence as a “ .. .sort of pure air blowing in world politics,
destroying illusions and cleaning places of morbid, miasmatic gases,” resistant to
democraey."^^
Between the Spanish-Cuban-American War and W ilson’s first run for the presidency,
the county’s focus had turned inward with domestic concerns dominating the national
agenda. During the 1912 presidential campaign, the Democratic Party listed nothing in
its platform concerning foreign policy. Wilson only mentioned foreign affairs from a
domestic commercial point of view. The one exception to this came in his speech

“Democracy and Efficiency,” October 10, 1900, PWW. 12:18; News report of address in Montclair, NJ,
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accepting the nomination, in which Wilson addressed the issue of self-government in the
Philippines, and expressed his “we hold their country in trust for them” concept.'^'^

Foreign Policy as President
Once W ilson’s first term as president began, actual foreign policy decisions tested all
his ideology and interpretations of prior U.S. foreign policy. His religious views
continued to form the basis of his ideology. Christianity functioned to raise up both the
self and others, and the ultimate source of peace for Christians was Jesus Christ. The
parallels between patriotism and Christianity remained: “[Both] make [a man] forget
himself and square every thought and action with something infinitely greater than
himself.”

Wilson continued to blend God and humanity as focal points for action. In

Charlotte, North Carolina, in 1916, he ended his address with a reference to a Bible
passage, “ ‘after the wind, after the earthquake, after the fire, the still small voice of
humanity.’” Such use of the Bible remained a common characteristic of W ilson’s

speeches."^®
Wilson explained his general understanding of several concepts that shaped foreign
policy early in his first term. He described basing foreign policy decisions on
commercial issues as a dangerous approach, an understandable position given his primary
domestic goal of reforming big business. Moreover, Wilson felt that great spiritual forces
were at work in Europe, especially after the war started in 1914, and the United States
Edwin Doak M ead to WW, August 10, 1912, PWW. 25:19; Diary of Oswald Garrison Villard, August
14, 1912, PWW. 25:24-25; Nomination acceptance speech, August 7, 1912, PWW. 25:4-16; Address in
New York to the National League of Commission Merchants, January 11, 1912, PWW. 24:33.
Remarks to the Gridiron Club, December 11, 1915, PWW. 35:343.
Address in Charlotte, NC, May 20, 1916, PWW. 37:83; Interview by Ida Minerva Tarbell, October 3,
1916, PWW. 38:325. W ilson’s uncited Biblical allusion is not a specific passage in the Bible, and the
closest match, 1 Kings 19:10-12, describes Elijah the prophet’s encounter with God according to traditional
Hebrew and Christian interpretation, not humanity as Wilson asserted.
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had to act in accord with those forces. He preferred America to function as peacemaker
for the world:
We are the champions of peace and concord. ..it is our dearest present hope that
this character and reputation may presently, in God’s Providence, bring us an
opportunity such as seldom has been vouchsafed any nation, the opportunity to
consol and obtain peace in the world and reconciliation and a healing settlement
of many a matter that has cooled and interrupted the friendship of nations.'*^
He remained committed to doing whatever was necessary to maintain moral influence in
foreign relations, thinking that influence provided a way to peace. He believed that a
certain type of man would rise up, and save the world through service. Wilson based his
belief in the United States peacemaking ability on the multi-ethnic composition of the
U.S. population. Due to the presence of citizens from all the countries at war in the
United States, only America understood all the conflicting nations and could thereby
mediate a peace.'^^
Although the two primary foreign policy concerns of W ilson’s first term were Mexico
and the growing trouble in Europe, his policies also addressed other nations and
problems. When the issue of delivering promised loans to China appeared in 1913, he
refused to back the previous administration’s loan policies out of fear of so upsetting the
financial and political situations that the infant democratic process in China might be
endangered.'*^ W ilson’s reverence for democracy and America’s destiny to lead other
countries to democracy shaped his China policy, requiring him to withhold the promised
loan, lest democracy not advance. As time passed, and thereby his criteria of extended
learning for those governed was increasingly met, Wilson favored advancing toward self-
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government for the Philippines and Puerto Rico.^** As in China, he expected morality to
guide policy in Panama, and Latin America. He looked forward to eventual spiritual
union between the United States and Latin America, based on increasing mutual
understanding as Latin America adapted greater degrees of constitutional liberty. He
believed that the consent of the governed differed between the United States and other
countries during his life, but at some point in the future Latin America’s people would
understand democracy as Americans did in his time. At that point, true fellowship would
be possible with both parties viewing democracy in the same w ay/'
Mexico proved to be a critical area for foreign relations for Wilson, who fit his
responses to the changes occurring in Mexico during his first term to the dictates of his
ideology. In 1913 after he took office, Wilson expressed U.S. interest in M exico’s selfgovernment and its constitutional stability, offering U.S. assistance to achieve a peaceful
outcome. Mexico rejected U.S. assistance. Wilson concluded that America needed to
wait and not give material aid to any side, since the morally right side would win.
Thinking he based his views on early American history, he claimed that to rob the
democratic side in the Mexican revolution of the opportunity to struggle toward a more
democratic form of government would be to deny Mexico the benefit of active pursuit of
obedience to the law of liberty. Wilson viewed this opportunity as one of the
requirements of the formation of a democracy. Thus, America had an obligation to study
governmental situations in general, and Mexico in particular, to ensure that neither
Americans nor other citizens could be deprived of the right to opportunities necessary for
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constitutional government. Unless changes in the progression of the revolution removed
those opportunities altogether, the United States needed to wait and see if Mexico could
work out its problems independently.^^
By the end of 1913, multiple policy failures convinced Wilson that withholding aid
from both sides would not end the civil war. To prevent some outside, perhaps European,
force from becoming involved, as well as to ensure the defeat of Victoriano Huerta,
Wilson approved a change in U.S. policy to permit shipping materials to the anti-Huerta
Constitutionalists led by Venustiano Carranza. This decision reflected both W ilson’s
willingness to actively apply the Monroe doctrine, and, the importance of respecting
constitutional government, even when a group only professed allegiance to such
concepts. Wilson earnestly desired that other countries respect the United States. In
accordance with his professed willingness to use force only when the cause was right, he
allowed use of military force only to ensure the respect of the United States.^^ Wilson
eulogized the Americans killed during the occupation of Veracruz in Mexico with his
highest honor - they did their duty, ensuring respect for the United States. Wilson also
thought that other nations should be encouraged to respect the Mexicans America
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supported, which was consistent with his view of America as the leader of the world in
the drive toward democracy. Everyone should follow the leader.
In 1915, when the Constitutionalists engaged in more infighting than democracy
building, Wilson warned that unless the fighting within the group ceased, the United
States would become militarily involved. Internal conflict led to lawlessness, and liberty
required law. He argued for compliance with his demands, since although America was
not at war with Mexico, various factions received U.S. support. Overt support of the
defenders of democracy, not military action, remained the right cause at the time. Wilson
based his decision not to intervene at that time on his aversion to compulsion. He
thought compulsion required a long-term investment, as in case of the Philippines. Some
countries might then accuse the United States of self-serving imperialism, and he firmly
believed such action to be immoral, and at odds with America’s special destiny. Wilson
envisioned a noble limit: “We will aid and befriend Mexico, but we will not coerce her;
and our course with regard to her ought to be sufficient proof to all America that we seek
no political suzerainty or self-control.”^^ In contrast to subsequent historians such as
William Appleman Williams, Wilson believed only physieal force constituted coercion,
and therefore thought his policies consistent with his professed ideology.
By 1916, Wilson discerned little choice other than force, since the lack of a stable
Mexican government rendered diplomacy impossible. Liberty, and hence democracy,
without law was impossible. To avoid threats to U.S. citizens and lands, Wilson
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determined to clear all armed forces from the Mexican states bordering the United States.
He would have declared war at this point, but his ideology restrained him since there
existed no legal government in Mexico. The will of the people to form a democratic
government was being ignored. His goal over his first term remained the same: a stable,
constitutional Mexican government. According to Wilson, U.S. military activity, such as
the pursuit of Pancho Villa, in a foreign country did not constitute intervention. He
defined intervention as, “ ... an attempt to determine for the Mexican people what the
form, the circumstances, and the personnel of their government shall be, or upon what
terms and in what manner a settlement of their disturbed affairs shall be effected.”^’
Despite such definitions, W ilson’s war-like actions undoubtedly constituted imperialistic
activity, given the inevitable impact such dealings had on the people of Mexico as they
sought to form a government. When Wilson accepted the Democratic nomination in
1916, he asserted that U.S. policy toward Mexico had accorded with principle, respecting
the sovereign authority of both Mexico and the United States. Thus, America’s policy
sought to encourage the emancipation of the Mexican people without denying Mexico the
right to choose and direct in a legitimate constitutional fashion their own leaders and
government.^^ As historian Thomas Knock has observed, Wilson knew that some of his
actions regarding Mexico conflicted with his ideology. He believed such actions were
necessary to accomplish his overarching policy goal of a government with which any
similar future U.S. action would be unnecessary. Wilson approached the conflict in
Europe with similar assumptions.^^
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W ilson’s attitude toward the war in Europe went through two distinct stages. When
the war began in 1914, he was primarily concerned with domestic reaction. He wanted to
avoid divisions among the U.S. population based on European heritage. He called for a
national day of prayer and supplication because of the war, and thereby sought to unite
the country and keep the United States neutral. Wilson believed that the United States’
ability to mediate a peace depended on two factors. The first was Europe’s perception of
the United States as neutral and at peace, ready to mediate. His desire for this role
reflected not only his belief that the president of the United States was the only
instrument of government with any significant power to make foreign policy decisions,
but his view that slow, reasoned choices should decide such matters instead of passionate,
hasty ones. W ilson’s course of action also mirrored his inability to ascertain a “right
cause,” one consistent with his perception of American ideals, for U.S. involvement in
the European war. The second factor Wilson saw shaping U.S. ability to mediate a peace
related to the multiethnic makeup of the country’s population. He perceived the melting
pot nature of American society as providing America a unique mediatorial ability. By
virtue of its citizens, only the United States could fully understand the viewpoints of all
the sides in the conflict, and hence promote a truly neutral peace.^°
As the 1916 U.S. election neared, Wilson changed his perspective. He suggested
with German U-boats sinking passenger and freight ships, a rationale for breaking
diplomatic relations existed. Wilson compared the European conflict to America’s
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Revolutionary War, describing both as wars of competing political systems. At the same
time, he was convinced the people wanted him to make peace in Europe. This could only
happen if America remained neutral. Wilson sought neutrality for three reasons. First,
neutrality was the traditional U.S. policy in European conflicts. Second, the United
States ostensibly had no stake in European developments. In fact, the origins of the war
had nothing to do with America. Third, neutrality helped prevent the spread of hate
while providing a foundation on which to build peace. Wilson admitted in an October
1916 interview that he attempted to look at the war from the viewpoint of a historian as
well as a participant. He was acutely aware of the historian’s judgment that the actor
should have known available information. This awareness prompted him “ ...t o let
nothing hasten me, nothing tempt me to override principles.”^* Wilson pursued a long
view, of the war in Europe, rather than reacting to details. This policy reflected his
preference for reason over passion, and slow resolutions based on consideration of
choices, rather than crude, hasty, or reactionary action.^^
While W ilson’s European policies did not completely favor one side over the other,
his neutrality was clearly biased. Ernest May has described a general American belief at
the time: “It was thought possible to be sympathetic yet completely neutral.” W ilson’s
policies tended to benefit the Allies instead of the Germans. Not only were many of
W ilson’s closest advisors pro-British, but some, such as Colonel Edward M. House, were

Interview by Ida Minerva Tarbell, October 3, 1916, PWW. 38:327.
® Address in Charlotte, NC, May 20, 1916, PWW. 37:81; Address to a Joint Session of Congress, April 19,
1916, PWW. 36:509-510; Nomination Acceptance Speech in Long Branch, NJ, September 2, 1916, PWW.
38:132; Address in W ashington to the League to Enforce Peace, May 27, 1916, PWW. 37:116; Interview
by Ida Minerva Tarbell, October 3, 1916, PWW. 38:327; Address in Omaha, October 5, 1916, PWW.
38:347. For evaluations of how truly neutral U.S. policy was see Knock, To End All W ars. 34, 64-65;
May, W ar and American Isolationism. 34-53; and Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality.
1914-1915. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 57-73 and 682-693.
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convinced that a German victory threatened the United States. Patrick Devlin has
chronicled W ilson’s numerous recreational trips to Britain, his affection for British
authors and his preference for British spelling before his entry into politics. Experiences
and preferences of this nature no doubt also influenced W ilson’s foreign policy
decisions.^^
One specific area in which W ilson’s thoughts concerning Europe shifted clearly was
preparedness. In 1914, Wilson first broached the subject and judged the current level of
U.S. military power sufficient. In early 1915, he suggested people should begin to think
of America first. By late 1915, Wilson requested increases in military spending to ensure
that America remained prepared. W ilson’s 1916 definition of preparedness fit a
defensive model that envisioned neither war nor peace, but focused on access or impact
on items of interest. He spent a significant amount of time giving preparedness lectures
in 19Ib.^'* This effort correlated with W ilson’s understanding that the minority used
gradual persuasion to gain the confidence of the masses. Hence, his preparedness efforts
reflected his pattern of giving many speeches over an extended period to change the
public mind.

Conclusion
Exposed to religious instruction from earliest childhood, Woodrow Wilson
incorporated protestant Christian eoneepts into all aspeets of his ideologieal thought. He
used ideas gathered from his father’s teaching and his own adult experience in

May, W ar and American Isolationism 36, 45, 77; Devlin, Too Proud to Fight. 26-29.
Annual M essage to Congress, December 8, 1914, PWW. 31:421; Remarks to the Associated Press in
New York, April 20, 1915, PWW. 33:38; Annual Message on the State of the Union, December 7, 1915,
PWW. 35:298-299; Address in New York on Preparedness, January 27, 1916, PWW. 36:12; Address in
Chicago on Preparedness, January 31, 1916, PWW. 36:64.
^
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Presbyterianism, along with much of the Christianity common to late nineteenth century
America, to express his beliefs about the role of the United States in the world and the
principles used to guide foreign policy. Wilson recognized his religious inconsistencies
without permitting them to hinder his exercise of his religion or hamper the impact on his
ideology. Viewing action as the natural outcome of religion, and service as the highest
form of action, he linked Christianity to the destiny and role of America. Patriotic
service to the country and religious service to God assumed virtually synonymous status
in his mind as he drew strong parallels between religion and patriotism.
Wilson considered religion to be a necessary foundation within leaders. As bold
visionaries, these men pursued their own vision rigorously. A good leader possessed
oratorical skills, since self-governance functioned via reasonable persuasion in a
democracy. As Wilson learned from his father, oratory needed to communicate simply
and directly to the masses. When he examined the presidency historically, he found the
president functioned as the leader of the country, and the primary actor in foreign
relations. The Senate, as the only other branch of government involved in foreign policy,
merely voted on treaties the president negotiated. The president’s input came from the
masses, not special interests or other small groups.
His understanding of the destiny and role of the nation reflected W ilson’s ideology as
much as his thoughts on leadership and the presidency. America had a religious duty to
spread democracy, aiding those countries that sought to move toward the ideal form of
self-government found in American democracy. Development of democracy required
freedom of public opinion and liberty to shape self-government. The duty of the United
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States was to provide guidance to other countries in this process. When America acted,
its deeds restrained aggression rather than pursuing it.
As he analyzed U.S. foreign policy, Wilson argued a major shift occurred in 1898
with the Spanish-Cuban-American War. Embracing Turner’s frontier thesis, Wilson
claimed direct involvement in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Latin America
demonstrated U.S. desire to foster democracy. His Mexican policy reflected the
importance he placed on promoting what he viewed as legitimate, constitutional
government, along with America’s providential role as a mediator of peace and instances
where he found force a necessary tool of diplomacy. Wilson’s European policy,
emphasizing neutrality and peace, exhibited the same ideological priorities even as he
embraced preparedness in light of submarine warfare and the increasing prospect of U.S.
involvement in the war in Europe.
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CHAPTER 2

PRINCIPLES EXPRESSED IN PUBLIC SPEECHES
Through his presidential speeches before U.S. entry into World War 1, Wilson voiced
his ideological assumptions on foreign policy. He communicated what he considered the
important concepts influencing foreign relations that the public should know. Wilson
explained in his speeches what he was doing and how the audience should respond. He
presented information concerning the presidency in the abstract, and specific data about
his performance of the office, as well as thoughts about the function of the U.S.
government, the Constitution, and political parties. He often used specific religious
language to convey his meanings. Wilson focused on principles that shaped the decisions
and legislation he supported, and broad methods for implementing these ideals. By
insuring that his audience knew the principles shaping his policies, Wilson laid the
foundations to address specific diplomatic issues, and explain the thoughts and actions
U.S. foreign policy required from him and the country.

Public Speaking
Wilson expressed several ideas about his public speaking. Addressing the Gridiron
Club of Washington, he analogized the function of public speakers to that of shining a
spotlight to find out if the individual highlighted would attempt to hide or not. This

30
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description shared the idea of examination for the sake of public education with W ilson’s
view of his public speaking. Instructional oratory was not solely W ilson’s professed
understanding of what he did when speaking. Because of his distrust of newspaper
opinions, Wilson portrayed giving a speech as a way to get to know someone. He once
informed his audience that giving talks invigorated his spirit. He also described his
speaking as preaching in a luncheon address to a group of women;
What I want, therefore, to preach from this time on, in office or out of office,
because even out of office I can retain my powers of elocution - what I intend to
preach from this time on is that America must show that, as a member of the
family of nations, she has the same attitude toward the other nations that she
wishes her people to have toward each other;..
To refer to his speaking as preaching presents an interesting perspective, considering both
the influence of his father on his writing and speaking, as well as the commonality of
preaching and his view of speaking both seeking persuasive change/^
Often when speaking, Wilson described his function as interpreting the spirit of the
occasion or subject. This perspective illustrates W ilson’s use of multiple meanings for a
single word. In other instances, use of the word “spirit” could refer to the opinion or
belief of a group, or the assumptions of the country. When he used spirit in the
“assumption” context, Wilson generalized the sentiments expressed, often attempting to
summarize the principles articulated. The acceptance speech for the 1916 Democratic
presidential nomination illustrated this use of spirit. He referred to his speech as an

Luncheon Address to W omen in Cincinnati, October 26, 1916, PW W . 38:530.
“ Remarks to the Gridiron Club of Washington, April 12, 1913, PW W . 27:296; Address in Philadelphia to
Newly Naturalized Citizens, May 10, 1915, PW W . 33:150; Address to the American Electric Railway
Association, January 29, 1915, PW W . 32:149; John Milton Cooper, Jr., Breaking the Heart of the World:
W oodrow W ilson and the Fight for the League of Nations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 431-2. The papers (mostly sermons) of Joseph R. W ilson occupy 0.25 cubic feet at the archives of
the Presbyterian Historical Society in Montrent, NC. It would be interesting to compare the structure of the
elder W ilson’s sermons with the younger’s speeches to evaluate some of Cooper’s conclusions .
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attempt to interpret the meaning and the spirit of the Democratic Party platform, without
listing or addressing any platform planks/^

Performance of Duties
Wilson stressed his impartiality in the exercise of his duties. As chief executive, he
claimed to express the opinion of American citizens, rather than his own. He clarified
that he did not confuse the opinion of newspaper editorials and the popular view. “With
all due respect to editors of great newspapers, I have to say to them that I never take my
opinions of the American people from their e d i t o r i a l s . W i l s o n ’s education of his
audience on this point was one of his most common emphases in his speeches. In his
attempts to claim his opinions were not his own, he explained his unique personal
circumstances. Being president denied him expression of his opinion, as his job required
he focus exclusively on the country’s interests and not his own. By emphasizing this
point, Wilson not only claimed he spoke for the majority of Americans, he suggested
those opposing him did not/^
W ilson’s stress on national opinion reflected his need to interact with the people
beyond the confines of Washington, D.C. As he stated during a Flag Day celebration: “I
felt caught up and buoyed along by the great stream of human purpose which seemed to

Memorial Day Address, May 30, 1916, PWW, 37: 123; After Dinner Talk, December 9, 1916, PWW.
40:193; Speech in Long Branch, New Jersey, Accepting the Presidential Nomination, September 2, 1916,
PWW 38:127.
^ Jackson Day Address in Indianapolis, January 8, 1915, PW W . 32:29.
^ Jackson Day Address in Indianapolis, January 8, 1915, PW W . 32:39; Remarks to the Associated Press in
New York, April 20, 1915, PW W . 33:37; Remarks to the National Press Club, May 15, 1916, PW W . 37:
49; Remarks at a Reception in Cincinnati, October 26, 1916, PW W . 38: 52; Remarks, to the Gridiron Club,
December 11, 1915, PW W . 35: 340. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, W ilson’s refusal to change
during the League fight could be considered an example of his willingness to pursue his perception of
national opinion at great personal cost, or of W ilson’s personal opinion at odds with the nations. Such
arguments would need to be tempered by the impact of his physical condition at the time and associated
issues.
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flow there in front of me by the stand at the White House, and I shall go away from this
meeting, as I came away from that parade, with all the deepest purposes of my heart
renewed.”^** His desire to have the affection of his fellow man made Wilson willing to
endure any physical hardship. He considered the people more inspiring than Congress,
and the people’s confidence sustained him. Contact with people away from Washington,
D.C. gave him the enthusiasm he needed to continue his work.^'
W ilson’s expressions of his desire for contact with non-politicians and government
functionaries served not only to justify his need to make speeches, but also reinforced the
image he cultivated of a common man elected to serve the people. He regularly
described himself as an average man, despite a Ph.D., a brief period as a lawyer, and
years spent as a college professor and president. As a common man, Wilson operated as
an associate, servant, or helper. He explained the function of both Congress and the
President as servants of the people. The American mind held no ambiguities for Wilson
because he served the force of human, righteous, and patriotic purpose that had originated
in the national consciousness. He claimed his service made him a counsel for the country
in a legal sense. Both W ilson’s benefit from interaction with the public and his
presentation of his role as a common servant with counsel to share served to strengthen
his justification for the one who governed to meet with citizens. By arguing that public
officials needed to confer with their people for both personal and national reasons,
especially to accurately assess public opinion, Wilson told his audiences why he was

™Flag Day Address, June 14, 1916, PW W . 37: 224.
Address to the Daughters of the American Revolution, October 11, 1915, PW W . 35: 51; Jackson Day
Address in Indianapolis, January 8, 1915, PW W . 32: 30; Remarks to the Associated Advertising Club, June
29, 1916, PW W . 37:328; Address to the Annual Baltimore Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church,
South, March 25, 1915. PW W . 32:431.
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speaking, created commonalities with them, and prepared the way for a favorable
reception of his ideas/"
Wilson explained that he had the support of the majority of people. This group, a
silent majority was not vocal about the issues. He reminded his listeners that the vocal
minority did not represent the views of the nation. His job as president was to interpret
the sympathies of the silent portion of the people and speak for them. Wilson claimed he
represented not only Americans, but also the silent mass of the world’s humanity. He
had no diffieulties with his duty in this regard:
I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere
who have as yet had not place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out
concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the person and
the homes they hold most dear.^^
The reasons behind the creation of the country, and his belief that the public would not
act inconsistently with its nature of loving liberty and desiring to promote peace and
democracy, provided Wilson with his information. He attributed his confidence
concerning their response to a sympathetic connection of impulse. This link left
questions in W ilson’s mind as to whether or not he had judged one instance or another
correctly, or if he had as the country’s spokesman functioned wisely. Still, he remained
instinctively confident that others had reaehed the same conclusions about the same
situations.^'*

Luncheon Address to the Chamber of Commerce of Columbus, Ohio, December 10, 1915, PW W .
35:324; Remarks on Signing the Tariff Bill, October 3, 1913, PW W . 28:352; Jackson Day Address in
Indianapolis, January 8, 1915, PW W . 32:30; Address for W ilson Day as Enclosure in WW to Vance
Criswell McCormick, October 15, 1916, PW W . 38: 462; Address in Indianapolis, October 12, 1916, PW W .
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While urging the majority to express their views, Wilson tried to stimulate the people
to do their duty by explaining what he was interpreting. He claimed that he occasionally
felt a strain when interpreting the country’s spirit, due to the unpredictability of foreign
nations:
But when the fortunes of your own country are, so to say, subject to the
incalculable winds of passion that are blowing through other parts of the world,
why, then the strain is of a singular and unprecedented kind, because you do not
know by what turn of the wheel of fortune the control of things is going to be
taken out of you hand.^^
Wilson saw his duty in speaking as one of interpretation. With some decisions, such as
the timing of necessary entry into the European war, his burden of choosing made him
sleepless over his interpretational duties since he was unsure he had the information to
interpret truly. To one audience Wilson explained this type of interpretation by
recounting a speech by the Japanese ambassador. Admitting that he had inferred his
point from the ambassador’s comments, Wilson claimed that the foundation of peace was
diplomats interpreting the spirits of nations to one another. The world needed such a
vision that could see beneath surface issues to the real needs, motives and sympathies of
mankind.’^

Decision Making
In several of his speeches, Wilson explained how he made decisions. For the
audience, understanding presidential decision-making was as important to supporting his

Remarks to the Belgian Commissioners, September 16, 1914, PWW 31: 34; Final Campaign Address,
November 4, 1916, PW W . 38: 615.
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Remarks to the National Press Club, May 15, 1916, PW W . 37: 47-49; Address in Charlotte, North
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judgments as the principles that informed those choices. Wilson attempted to view the
country as a whole in his heart. He looked at the past and envisioned the ideal future,
shaping policy based on whatever guiding principles applied. As he told one audience,
one of those principles was to ask himself what would the man on the street, mindful of
the country’s destiny, want as policy.^’
Often W ilson’s information sources in Washington consisted of the half—hour
statements of several men, presumably knowledgeable individuals, who filed through his
office to provide information on a subject. As he explained to the Daughters of the
American Revolution, whatever all those men agreed on was the truth, and the rest was
false. While advisors were fundamental to W ilson’s decision-making process, he
preferred to have the best information available with which to make choices. To the
Associated Press he explained: “The world is held stable by the man who waits for the
next day to find out whether the report was true or not.”’^ This desire to wait on the facts
to determine the truth represents part of an explanation for time lags between events and
W ilson’s responses, such as the time between the resumption of unrestricted submarine
warfare by Germany and his call for war, a period of two months.’^
The decision making process was not the only consideration that generated
complexities. Political differences created difficulties. Agitation by proponents of
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European intervention prompted confusion of national allegiance by reminding many
citizens of their loyalty to their native country. Wilson described the solution:
So, the United States has again to work out by spiritual process a new union,
when men shall not think of what divides them, but shall recall what unites them,
when men shall not allow old loves to take the place of present allegiances; where
men must, on the contrary, translate that very ardor of love of country of their
birth into the ardor of love for the country of their adoption and the principles it
represents.****
Wilson ran in 1916 for re-election, and worried that a Republican victory would result in
intervention in Europe. He characterized the loss of power by the Republicans in the
1912 elections as a practical and moral failure. The 1916 contest meant he could not get
any work done until after the election. Other countries’ reluctance to make decisions
until after the election made the handling of foreign relations almost impossible.**'

U.S. Government, Laws, and Parties
Wilson extended the basic information he shared with his audiences to other aspects
of how the U.S. government and laws functioned. He defined the ideal government as
one at the service of the modern world with no thought of profit for itself. According to
Wilson, government was the expression of the group conscience. On this basis, the
concept of self-determination in government logieally formed the best government. He
thought that the president and the people of the United States both embraced this notion,
which distinguished the nation from all others. Believing the ability to engage in this
kind of government had a basis in esehatological thought, W ilson asserted that the U.S.
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government functioned primarily as a servant of the people. Extending this idea, he
spoke of the U.S. government as the guarantor of human rights around the world. He
described as servant-government as based on principled public opinion and articulated by
implementation rather than expression of that opinion. Congress was the agent of this
action. He reminded Congress that he did not advocate his personal opinion on issues.
When asking Congress to repeal a section of the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 1912,
he told the body, “I ask this [the repeal] of you in support of the foreign policy of the
administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy
and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging m e a s u r e . W i l s o n
made the situation clear to Congress; he set foreign policy, and they approved whatever
he needed to accomplish his goal. This argument reinforced the idea that the agent of
action, in this case Congress, needed to listen to him since he had access to the opinion of
the people and with it the basis of national actions.
For Wilson, the Constitution gave form to the type of government required by popular
opinion. He portrayed the United States as the champion of constitutional government.
The sacred interests of such champions formed the basis of American duties. When
Wilson spoke, he emphasized the nature of the relationship between the law as embodied
in the U.S. Constitution and human nature and society. The focus of the nation was not
its founding document, but human nature and the makeup of society. Based on this
reasoning, when conflict between the two ensued, the U.S. Constitution changed, not
^ Address to Congress on Panama Canal Tolls, March 5, 1914, PW W . 29: 313.
Remarks at a Dinner Honoring George W ashington Goethals, March 3, 1914, PW W . 29, 307; Address to
the American Electric Railway Association, January 29, 1915, PW W . 32: 156; Jackson Day Address in
Indianapolis, January 8, 1915, PW W . 32: 39; Talk at Swarthmore College, October 25, 1913, PW W . 28:
441; Fourth of July Address, July 4, 1914, PW W . 30: 254; Address to a Joint Session of Congress, April,
19, 1916, PW W . 36: 510; Annual Message to Congress, December 8, 1914, PW W . 31: 420; Campaign
Address in Buffalo, November 1, 1916, PW W . 38:585; Address to Congress on Panama Canal Tolls,
March 5, 1914, PW W . 29: 312.
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human nature or society. Wilson argued that law was subservient to life and not the
reverse. Law did not exist in a vacuum, but interacted with society. He linked law and
religious concepts with the relationship of the individual to the masses concerning moral
issues. Moral judgment did not conform to the law, but law conformed to moral
judgment. Wilson viewed this as consistent with his ideas about principles shaping
beliefs that were to be transformed into actions. He suggested that lawyers, as agents of
transformation, were guardians of the spirit of righteousness. Law could then guide
society toward the divine in true Social Gospel fashion.*'*
While the U.S. Constitution and law provided the guidelines for the functioning of the
U.S. government, Wilson harbored reservations about the effect of parties on the smooth
operation of the government. He acknowledged that the nation used political parties to
accomplish its business of expressing national opinions. Political parties, not individuals,
served as the mechanism for national accomplishments. Wilson portrayed himself as a
party leader, who acted on party and not personal commands. However, Wilson thought
that the collective aspects of human nature bound the nation together, not parties or
interests. When evaluating the practical impact of political parties on the nation’s foreign
relations, Wilson generally reached a negative conclusion, as his comments a few days
before the election of 1916 illustrate:
You will see, of course, that I am merely illustrating the future of the nation by
mentioning some of the practical things that we have got to do and expressing to
you my impatience for the talk that has got to last until next Tuesday to be over. I
want all this irrelevant talk to end so that we can really begin again to accomplish
something.*^

^ Annual M essage to Congress, December 2, 1913, PW W . 29: 4; Draft of an Address to Congress, c.
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Religious Content
W ilson’s religious beliefs shaped the content of his speeches. His own religious
upbringing and adult practice, along with the Protestant Christian consensus of American
culture at the time, provided common religious knowledge he drew upon to make various
points.*^ He made extensive use of the Bible and references to God, along with specific
links to foreign policy. Even the way in which he shaped the conclusion of his speeches
reflected religious impact.
Wilson frequently mentioned Bible passages to illustrate a point, and to support his
linking of Christian concepts and national beliefs and duties. In an address to the
Pittsburgh YMCA in 1914, he alluded to an uncited scriptural reference to strengthen his
argument of earthly actions of a positive moral character benefiting the eternal state of
the individual. He argued to farmers that the first petition of the Lord’s Prayer showed
the national need for food for performance of the spiritual duties of the nation. Wilson
did not limit his specific Biblical references to general principles. When speaking about
policy foundations, he referred to a parable about sound and unsound foundations, with
the clear implication that his policies had solid underpinnings and others did not. During
the 1916 campaign, Wilson used the imagery of deception found in the account of the
Old Testament patriarch Jacob as an illustration of the contrast of Republican and
Democratic methods in regulation. He did not limit the use of the Bible in speeches to
particular references; the Bible itself had specific influence on the country and world.
The audience at W ilson’s address to the celebration of the centennial of the American
Bible Society heard him ascribe the unique status of the United States to the widespread

^ For an example of this phenomena, see John Milton Cooper, Jr., Pivotal Decades: The United States.
1900-1920. (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1990), 265-266.
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illumination the Bible provided the people, and to the prevalence of the Bible in
American society. He further identified the Bible as the common basis of ideals for
mankind, and as the source of peace and understanding. Missionaries, whose job it was
to spread the Bible around the world, seemed “ .. .like the shuttles in a great loom that is
weaving the spirits of men together.”^’
Wilson also referred to God in his speeches. Addressing the Daughters of the
American Revolution, he spoke of the creation of America based on principles previously
confined to Great Britain, but now destined to spread to all humanity, the purpose for
which God created the United States. Wilson used expressions such as “the bread of
life,” a phrase normally used in reference to Christian sacraments and as a deity
reference, when speaking of that unique aspect of America of which the people partook
and immigrants desired. He also used God as an example of nearly impossible action, as
when he questioned the possibility of God transforming human nature overnight in
reference to changing the opinions of those opposed to preparedness. Wilson informed
his listeners of his belief that service to the country equaled service to God, and at the
beginning of his first term he described the reforming spirit of the nation as similar to air
coming out of the presence of God, a good, cleansing, moral spirit possibly of divine
origin. His most common reference to God came through his multiple uses of the term
“Providence.” He attributed various forms of prosperity to Providence including the
general outcome of the year of 1913, cited the role of the United States in the world as

^ Address to the Pittsburgh YMCA, October 24, 1914, PW W . 31: 227; Campaign Address to Farmers at
Shadow Lane, October 21, 1916, PW W . 38: 508 (Bible passage Matthew 6:11); Inaugural Address, March
4, 1913, PW W . 27: 149 (Bible passage Lamentations 4:1-6); Talk to the Gridiron Club, February 26, 1916,
PW W . 36: 219 (Bible passage Matthew 7:24-27); Campaign Address to Young Democrats at Shadow
Lawn, September 30, 1916, PW W . 38:308 (Bible passage Genesis 27); Remarks Celebrating the Centennial
o f the American Bible Society, May 7, 1916, PW W . 36:629-631.
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one assigned by Providence, credited Providence with business reforms, and appealed to
Providence as the primary factor in a possible Demoeratie victory in the 1916
Presidential election.
Although Wilson used the Bible and references to God to describe many aspects of
his understanding of the nation and its affairs, his application of religious language to
foreign policy in his speeches increased as the possibility of U.S. participation in the war
in Europe grew larger. He claimed that the principles of Christianity constituted the heart
and soul of the great bodies of opinion that sustained world affairs. He shaped his
expressions of neutrality and peace with religious language and concepts. When he
spoke of the healing of the nations, Wilson explained that the only way to find peace was
in this healing, and the supreme plan of peace derived from one’s relation to Jesus Christ.
He told his listeners that liberty could not live in an atmosphere of war. The country
should pursue peace out of both a desire for liberty and the recognition, “ ...that the whole
destiny of mankind is moving along that path which that lonely figure of the Prince of
Peace once tried to point out and which he once trod himself with bleeding feet."^^ The
route to peace required the nation to make a contract, or covenant, with other nations
after the war in Europe ended, because neutrality would be impossible given changes in
the nature of war and international relations. If the country were to carry out the duty
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given it by God, then service required a covenant. His covenant idea, based on
Presbyterian theology, found ultimate expression in the League of Nations.
Wilson portrayed the task of Christianity as serving the world by spreading the
Gospel. As part of his function as the country’s leader, he was leading the country in the
direction of God. He claimed Christians were evangelizing to unite the world: “We are
trying in the spread of the Gospel to make all the nations of the world of one mind, of one
enlightenment, of one motive, driven through every effort of their lives by one devotion
and one allegiance. Can you conceive of a greater enterprise than that?”^' Evil was
present in much of the world, and Wilson and those who shared his views were purging
the evil so that good could transform the world unhindered. Evil and sinister influences
tinged all forces derived from the world. Only the church was pure, and Wilson
envisioned Christian principles destroying the evil in the world. He cited as an
illustration of progress in eliminating evil the existence of treaties that required a time
interval to pass before troubled nations took action.^”

Foundational Principles
To gain support for the foreign policy ideology and actions, Wilson also attempted to
identify and elucidate the underlying principles his audiences needed to hear. The ways
and means by which countries put their guiding beliefs into action could change and
foster dispute, Wilson asserted, but principles were not debatable. Given the immutable
Address to the Annual Baltimore Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, March 25, 1915,
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nature of these concepts, Wilson believed that in complex situations following principles
was the safest course. This method provided a solid foundation from which all decision
making flowed. Due to this perspective, he expressed the need for national affairs and
policy to always rest on principle, not on the expediency of the moment.
Since principles formed the basis for U.S. policy and action, Wilson set out several
fundamental concepts that shaped the ideals upon which he based administration
positions. The core of U.S. beliefs included the importance of national sovereignty in
choosing rulers. As he explained, this meant the governed chose the rulers without
outside coercion. This independence extended to territorial integrity as well. Those who
chose their own government also had the right to freedom from aggression, freedom from
the abuse of personal liberties, and freedom from other nations disturbing the peace.^
Continuing to define fundamental principles for his listeners, Wilson described
Americans as dedicated and devoted to the love of justice, righteousness, and human
liberty. He applied this understanding to the country and defined the national perspective
as Americanism, which was a dedication to the ideas of drawing other country’s interests
into line with American interests and pursuing common good will. This unique national
viewpoint also embodied a devotion to justice and to liberty of all men. The government
that fostered such principles ruled by democracy, which Wilson considered antithetical to
holding to class interests. He described those promoting class differences as the enemies
of mankind. Democracy also held a deep spiritual meaning for Wilson: “Democraey
isn’t a form of government... It is an insight into the essential relationship of men to each
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other.”'^'^ Wilson identified three key principles. First, every American’s duty was to
exalt the national conscience by purifying their individual motives and exhibiting
devotion to the country. Second, the country should be ready to vindicate its principles at
any cost. Third, a central principle of American life held that small bodies of persons
should not be trusted to determine the policy and development of the nation. Upon initial
examination, this third principle appeared to contradict W ilson’s methods of conducting
government. He regularly made most decisions for the nation by himself or based on
input from a small select group of advisors. The resolution to this inconsistency lay in
W ilson’s belief that he knew and aeted on the opinion of the country, thereby avoiding
governance by small group with its own agenda and no interest in the national opinion.^^
Wilson promoted additional important principles; patriotism, loyalty, and American
duty. He portrayed patriotism as a willingness to pursue the right things to the point of
self-sacrifice if needed, even if the world opposed the effort. These ideals had guided the
American Revolution, which had not been the completion of a break with Great Britain,
but a beginning of a change in the world. W ilson’s generation had the opportunity to
bring to completion the sharing of this active principle of conduct with the world.
Patriotism could redeem a nation and regenerate the world.^^
Loyalty, especially loyalty to the flag, was the first test of acceptance in evaluating a
person. Wilson suggested the basis for loyalty was spiritual, not material. “It [the loyal
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act of honoring a flag] is to be achieved as we think, as we purpose, as we believe."^^ At
the heart of such loyalty lay self-sacrifice. He presented this perspective as an absolute
principle. Willingness to sacrifice all self-interest, and life itself if necessary, upon the
call of the country constituted true loyalty.'^^
Wilson defined the duty of a nation as expressing its own principles in the
international realm from the start and rejecting all rival ideals. “It is our duty and our
privilege to be like the eountry we represent and speaking no word of malice, no word of
criticism, even, stand shoulder to shoulder to lift the burden of mankind in the future and
show the paths of freedom to all the world.” '^° On other occasions he declared that
America’s duty to the world depended on how it performed its duty to itself. If a nation
were regularly true to its prineiples of action, then it would know how to proceed when
the time for action arrived. Wilson pleaded with people to be willing to sacrifice all for
peace. The only exception was the sense of humanity and justice that defined America.
As the war loomed larger, he encouraged the masses that their duty to America required
the presentation of a unified front to the foreign nations of the world.’*^'
Wilson spoke of the country’s duty to the world in part because he believed American
principles were the world’s principles. In his “Peace Without Victory” speech on January
22, 1917, he argued that American principles and policies belonged to mankind, and
therefore must prevail. This was not the first time Wilson had professed this idea
publicly. In his 1913 annual message to Congress, he described the interests of the
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country and the world as co-incident. As he told one audience, the United States stood
for concepts that the entire world sought:
We want no nation’s property. We wish to question no nation’s honor. We wish
to stand selfishly in the way of the development of no nation. We want nothing
that we cannot get by our own legitimate enterprise and by the inspiration of our
own example. And, standing for these things, it is not pretension on out part to
say that we are privileged to stand for what every nation would wish to stand for,
and speak for those things which all humanity must desire.
He believed that such principles would easily cross national boundaries because at the
deepest levels all the world’s people had an instinctive friendship for one another.
Because the principles of men who articulated public opinion dominated the world at the
time of his presidency, he hoped for a great rush of Christian principles into strongholds
of evil. Fighting evil with light made possible raising up the world up to American ideals
for the first time.'°^
Wilson emphasized the importance of passing on American principles because he
believed that only America could save the world. He told an audience on July 4, 1914, of
his dream of the United States serving as a source of worldwide moral uplift. He
explained that America intended from the first to be the servant of mankind. The world
needed a country to show the way to justice, freedom, and liberty, and the United States
had come in to existence for just that reason. Wilson claimed America’s unique ethnic
makeup made the nation a prophetic sample of mankind that had never before existed.
America’s unique makeup contributed to the exceptional nature of the country and its
endeavors, led to universal aeeeptance o f U .S. moral judgments o f mankind, and

increased U.S. credibility with international community.

At a dinner to honor engineer
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George W. Goethals, Wilson remarked, “The United States has made the world very
uncomfortable, but it has at least done so by the exercise of extraordinary dynamic
qualities. It is not one of the static nations of the w o r l d . H e thought America’s
pursuit of a new path distinguished it from all other countries. In standing apart and
standing for peace, the United States adopted a singular position. As he spoke to
different groups, Wilson described the U.S. role as lighting the way for other countries
down the path toward democracy. Nations would follow due to America’s moral
authority, which grew even if Americans were unaware of any increase in their
influence.
Wilson often referred to the spirit of America. He defined it for one group as an
absolute disinterestedness, focused on spiritual and material results, rather than selfinterest. The term “spirit” in this definition reflected the opinion or viewpoint of
America, and described a focus on the non-material aspects of existence. For Wilson the
expression carried Christian overtones. Based on the possession of a similar spirit, a
foreign group could earn an official relationship with the U.S. government. He viewed
the spirit of America as one of peace, but one that self-consciously knew its mission and
desired to command the respect of the world. Flsewhere, he equated the spirit of
American with a guiding moral force. He suggested to an audience of farmers that the
country’s distinguishing feature was spiritual, which he described as an attitude of
concern for the general welfare of all humanity, not just Americans. Wilson also
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expressed the idea of the spirit of America as a combination of strength, courage, and
force of will: “We love that quiet, self-respecting, unconquerable spirit which doesn’t
strike until it is necessary to strike, and then strikes to conquer.”

However he defined

it, Wilson spoke frequently to his audiences of the spirit of America. He regularly
assumed his audience understood what he meant and shared his assessment.'"^
One of the most important principles Wilson addressed in his speeches was peace,
particularly as it related to the war in Europe. Generally, he preferred restraint in the
language he and others used in talking about peace, so that those who espoused a more
moderate position between proponents of peace and proponents of war would not be
alienated from the pro-peace position. True to his methodology, he proposed peace in
terms of principles rather than recommending specific programs. Wilson defined peace
as more than not fighting. He told his listeners that peace was the healing and elevating
influence in the world. Force accomplished no permanent solutions. Only the opinion of
mankind could achieve any lasting peace by focusing on the issues after any use of force
had ended. According to Wilson, one reason Americans desired peace was “ .. .they love
peace and have nothing to do with the present quarrel [war in Europe].” '"^ He suggested
the reasons for the war were so obscure and hidden in foreign national agendas that
Americans did not understand why the combatants fought. It seemed to the people of the
United States that those in the war were so engulfed in conflict they appeared deranged.
W hy then, Wilson posited, would anyone want anything to do with madness? The task of
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remaining cool and levelheaded in the midst of such difficulties fell to the United States.
If no country kept the peace going during a time of war, then there would be no source of
impartial judgment when the war ended/"^
Lasting world peace depended on several principles, according to Wilson. Other
countries needed to recognize the necessity o f government decided by popular choice.
Without this concept, any peace would lack the support of the people and fail. By late
I9I4, Wilson believed that any peace settlement should involve an assessment of
responsibility and consequences for wrongs. When the war ended, “ .. .the nations of
Europe will assemble to determine a settlement. Where wrongs have been committed,
their consequences and the relative responsibility involved will be assessed.” " " He told
the people that the job of the United States was not to judge those involved in the war and
their reasons for fighting. Americans needed to focus on assisting to reconstruct the
peace once the war ended. He did not explain exactly how it was possible to assess
responsibility and assign consequences without judging those involved.'"
For all his talk of principles and ideals, Wilson fully intended action to be the
eventual outcome of U.S. policy. However, he articulated his expressions of the need for
action in terms of principles. He explained that the rightness of America’s ideals made
the country too proud to fight. Past international actions demonstrated the nation’s ideals
to those foreign countries paying attention. According to Wilson, American involvement
in the Spanish-Cuban-American War evidenced a willingness to fight for ideals. The
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United States did not want to fight unless national ideals were threatened. As
involvement in the war in Europe became more likely, Wilson outlined for his audiences
the criteria under which U.S. action would become necessary, criteria expressed as
principles. He asserted that Americans wanted to know what it was they would be
fighting for if they had to fight, because they were only willing to fight for the rights of
mankind. Implicit in such a statement was the idea that if an action could be construed to
violate the principle of the rights of mankind, then that action would require the
American people to fight. Wilson did not deny that the United States was a powerful
nation with great potential for the use of force. He proposed that the country desired to
use its force for ideal objectives, eschewing self-aggrandizement. Assuming no
American involvement, he suggested that when the war in Europe ended, the United
States needed to stand with a single, united purpose. While the nation was powerful and
could crush foreign countries, it preferred to serve the other nations. Wilson thus
established that America would fight to defend its principles, but those principles drove
the nation to act in service and peace. He believed that in such an environment, ideals
were contagious, and America had a special duty to share those ideals."^
Wilson described one way the United States could convey to foreign nations what the
country stood for, what its ideals were, at a lunch in New York in 1915. He suggested
that the Navy could provide non-Americans with a small degree of vision of what
America stood for, because the Navy was not a symbol of aggression. It was evidence of
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the moral principle that the country loved, a principle that was the only reason for the
United States to contend with another country. Elsewhere Wilson told his audience,
“America must hereafter be ready as a member of the family of nations to exert her whole
force, moral and physical, to the assertion of those rights [fundamental rights of
humanity] throughout the round globe.” '

The nation needed to remember that only a

unified spirit would enable America to play its role and occupy its international place,
and that the people of the United States did not habitually reject those who had rendered
them service. Guiding principles, which America had never lost sight of, would help
shape the country’s actions. These included justifying postwar property rights by making
claims for damages, and holding to account any who had violated national sovereignty or
killed innocent people."''

Conclusion
As Wilson gave various speeches, he communicated to his listeners many of the
underlying principles and roles that defined the specifics of his foreign policy thought
and decisions. He explained his distrust of newspaper opinions, the invigoration he
received from making speeches and getting to know those to whom he spoke, so that his
audience would understand why he was making a particular speech. He sought
simultaneously to educate an audience and learn from them. Audiences heard of his
efforts to interpret the spirit of an oecasion, or to summarize or highlight the important
ideas expressed. He assured the people that he valued their counsel and claimed he spoke
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to them in order to hear their advice; in doing so they could exchange opinions, and
determine what action needed to be taken.
W ilson’s claims conflicted with his other statements that he knew the majority’s
views and desired only expression of the silent consensus. If he knew what the public
thought, then why did he need their counsel? The method of learning from a group by
giving that group a speech also appears questionable. How can one hear counsel if those
giving it do not speak and only the one needing input talks? Issues of consistency aside,
Wilson asserted that he represented the silent majority, giving voice to their desires and
preferences. Wilson stressed his impartiality and efforts to represent the majority, even
in the face of both domestic and foreign impediments. He described his need for public
support and his sympathy with the common man, while explaining the benefits and
hindrances of the functioning of the U.S. government in carrying out any action on the
part of the people. He based the decisions of his presidency on the best information he
could obtain, without rushing to judgment.
Frequent use of religious examples and imagery helped Wilson connect with his
audience, and showed the foundations of his ideology. He used the Bible as both
illustration and explanation of the nation’s preferences and actions. Both God and
Providence received credit for much of the benefits the country enjoyed. He incorporated
religious language into discussions of foreign policy. By closely linking Christianity and
America, Wilson sought to guide the world to physical and spiritual fulfillment.
Wilson identified foundational principles and explained how they defined both policy
rationales and decisions. He stressed the importance of several concepts such as national
sovereignty, patriotism, loyalty, duty, the spirit of America, and peace. He spoke of
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America’s desire for good will and peace with all nations. He explained how American
principles were world principles, and how those principles could save the world, but only
if instituted as he had stipulated. Wilson explained that previous U.S. foreign relations
provided proof of America’s good intentions. He conveyed all these concepts in his
speeches for two reasons. First, he wanted his audience to benefit from what they heard,
and become better citizens and servants. Second, he laid the necessary groundwork for
more specific points in his speeches.
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CHAPTER 3

PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN POLICY IN PUBLIC SPEECHES
As Woodrow Wilson proceeded through his first term, and that short portion of his
second term before American entry into World W ar I, his speeches increasingly focused
on international concerns. From early in his first term he expressed principles of foreign
relations that changed little as world events unfolded. Wilson addressed several key
concepts concerning foreign policy in general and the situation in Europe in particular.
When the war began in Europe, he stressed the necessity of American neutrality and
pursuit of peace. He later spoke about the role of business and industry in U.S. foreign
relations, and the need for what would become the League of Nations. His most
significant speaking tour before the war dealt with the issue of preparedness, where all
the underlying principles and foreign policy concepts came together in an attempt to
sway the nation to his way of thinking. He engaged in three major speeches after the
resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Central Powers, the last of which
asked Congress for a declaration of war. Congress granted the request, and W ilson’s
prewar speeches came to an end.

Foreign Policy Principles - General
In his general description of U.S. foreign policy, Wilson identified several guiding
principles. According to him, these clear and consistent principles had been theoretical
55
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before his presidency; once in office, he practiced them. Early in his first term, he told an
audience that the United States was committed to pursuing an ideal foreign policy, not
governed by a pragmatic route because political and moral questions were involved.
Speaking of Latin American relations, he said: “We dare not turn from the principle that
morality, and not expediency, is the thing that must guide us, and that we will never
condone iniquity because it is more convenient to do so.” "^ Wilson also explained that
orderly government, based on the consent of the governed, formed a basis for U.S.
relations.""
Wilson further argued that American honor and obligations to world peace formed the
basis for resolving controversies with other countries. Applying such a standard
remained difficult because he found spiritual differences with other nations made
predicting their responses complicated, unlike domestic issues where he dealt with the
American spirit. Wilson emphasized in his speeches that deciding what to do with the
power the United States possessed was much more important than merely possessing it.
The reforms and actions America took for justice and humanity constituted the down
payment of U.S. spirit and purpose in world affairs.'"
Wilson argued that America’s international role was spiritual, and foreign countries
recognized the superiority of U.S. methods due to their spiritual nature. His reliance on
principles, even to the point of using ideals to describe policies, so governed W ilson’s
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methods that as late as October 1916 he told an audience that America had not yet
decided or formulated foreign policy regarding the country’s world role. Service, not
contention with men, had to characterize any mission the country embarked on, according
to Wilson. This approach governed U.S. policy until other countries no longer permitted
such action. The key to the formation of true constitutional liberty in other countries was
for the United States to help other nations without regard for U.S. national interests.
Once established, such governments would seek closer, stronger ties with America. He
assumed that the American public supported such a development because the founders
had created the nation to realize a true constitutional government."^
Wilson informed his audience that America’s role in the world had changed. The war
in Europe transformed the world so as to make neutrality and lack of involvement after
the war impossible. The changing times required the United States to be involved in
international politics because America had become a world power. The United States as
a major international player could no longer hold to a small, cautious, narrow view of
itself or its involvement in foreign affairs. Wilson suggested that Americans needed to
think of the use of the U.S. military as a service to the world: “ .. .that you have the point
of view of America with regard to her navy and her army; that she is using them as the
instruments of civilization, not as the instruments of aggression.” ' " Using American
power and influence harshly was not an option. While the country desired to avoid the
use of oppressive means, he argued that circumstances could occur which required the
use of violence to force a country to listen to America. Without force, the moral
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influence of the United States could be lost, along with any ability to exercise that
influence to aid foreign nations.""
Part of America’s role lay in its uniqueness. Wilson often told audiences of the
melting pot that made up the U.S. population. America’s blending of racial stocks
created a unique status for the nation, and gave it unmatched authority to work for peace
with multiple countries. Furthermore, unlike European nations, the United States had no
national momentum, or historical inertia, that drove the country down one particular
direction or path. Wilson claimed that these two characteristics, along with the absence
of U.S. ambition for power or colonies, put America in a unique position to serve the
nations of the world. When Wilson gave his final campaign address in the 1916
presidential campaign, he suggested that his goal for America, the idea of a country
pursuing unselfish service in foreign relations, was unprecedented in history, and within
the nation’s grasp."'
Wilson used principles and examples from non-European U.S. foreign relations to
clarify some general concepts about U.S. foreign policy. He referred to U.S. relations
with the Western Hemisphere, informing his audience that cultivating good relations with
that area was one of his chief foreign policy goals. Central and South America were just
beginning to trust and believe in the United States, and he presented true PanAmericanism as a cooperative effort of nations united in purpose and spirit. Wilson
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proposed several elements to keep hemispheric peace. These included guarantees of
territorial integrity and resolution of disputes by impartial investigation and arbitration.
Early in his presidency, he asserted the need for a western hemisphere devoted to the
concept of governments shaped by the consent of the governed.'"
Wilson used the Monroe Doctrine to link the foreign policy concepts and principles
of the western hemisphere to the European situation. American authority was the basis
for the Doctrine and the protection of the western hemisphere from European
encroachments. Wilson explained that application of this policy made the United States
spiritual partners with other hemisphere nations. He informed the Senate on January 22,
1917 how he wanted to apply the Monroe Doctrine:
I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the
doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should
seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people
should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development,
unhindered, unafraid, the little along with the great and pow erful.'"
Wilson argued that every forward-looking person worldwide agreed with these
principles. He described these ideals as the desire of nations. Only America possessed
these values; therefore, only America could bring them to the w o rld .'"
Despite espousing what some at the time, and many since, called imperialistic
principles for American foreign policy, Wilson denied such labels. He contended that
U.S. policies and possessions differed in significant ways from European empires. One
of the fundamental differences, according to Wilson, derived from God’s providential
Statement on Relations with Latin America, March 12, 1913, PW W . 27: 172; Address in Baltimore to
the Grain Dealers’ National Association, September 25, 1916, PW W . 38: 268; Annual Message on the
State of the Union, December 7, 1915, PW W . 35: 296; Address to the Pan American Scientific Congress,
January 6, 1916, PW W . 35: 445; Talk at Swarthmore College, October 25, 1913, PW W . 28: 441.
Address to the Senate, January 22, 1917, PW W . 40: 539.
Annual M essage on the State of the Union, December 7, 1915, PW W . 35: 295; Address to the Pan
American Scientific Congress, January 6, 1916, PW W . 35: 444; Commencement Address at the United
States Military Academy, June 13, 1916, PW W , 37: 316.
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care for America. North America had been kept unused and free from civilization,
reserved for a peaceful people who loved liberty and the rights of men above all else.
Following fellow Johns Hopkins alumnus Frederick Jackson Turner, Wilson explained
that the continental frontier had ended, and the Spanish-Cuban-American War had
expanded the American frontier, thrusting the United States into the international arena.
He reminded audiences that the United States desired no further possessions, conquests,
or territories. By contrast, the European powers wanted to expand their holdings, which
provided one more example of the difference between American and European
imperialism. The unique feature of American imperialism was one of willingness to help
and not harm; he found it inconceivable that America could take away anything from
another country. In short, U.S. control sprang from benign motives and produced
beneficial resu lts'"
For Wilson, America’s territorial possessions served to exhibit the earnest desire of
the United States to serve others and extend the benefits of American principles and
ideals. As trustees of foreign lands such as Puerto Rico and the Philippines, he thought
that America could not act without regard for the indigenous population. The United
States was to serve Puerto Rico, with the idea of one day withdrawing from the territory
entirely. The Filipinos may have doubted U.S. sincerity, but Wilson believed bills he had
signed concerning the Philippines showed clearly the intent of the United States to
support eventual self-rule. Wilson suggested that the single biggest obstacle to peaceful
Address in Omaha, October 5, 1916, PW W . 38: 345; Commencement Address at the United States
Military Academy, June 13, 1916, PW W , 37: 214; Remarks at a Reception in Cincinnati, October 26, 1916,
PW W . 38: 525; A Luncheon Address to the Chamber of Commerce of Columbus, Ohio, December 10,
1915, PW W . 35:327; Memorial Day Address, May 30, 1916, PW W . 37: 126; Nonpartisan Address in
Cincinnati, October 26, 1916, PW W . 38: 538; Mulder, Preparation. 121,135. For a fascinating examination
of U.S.-Indian relations under a foreign relations rubric, along with a comparison of American and British
imperial methods, see James O. Gump, The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the
Sioux. (Lincoln, NE: The University of Nebraska Press, 1994, First Bison Books printing, 1996).
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relations with other countries was their ineredulity at American statements of sincere
unselfishness in matters pertaining to territorial possessions. “But, my friends, the world
does not understand that yet. It has got to have a few more demonstrations, like the
demonstration in Cuba. It has got to have a few more vindications of the American
name.” ’"

Neutrality
With the initiation of the war in Europe, Wilson appealed to Americans to remain
rigorously neutral. He suggested that only Americans could determine the response of
Americans to the war, but all who loved Ameriea would embraee neutrality. The people
needed to be neutral in thought and deed, lest the opportunity for the United States to
mediate a peace be lost. Wilson deseribed neutrality as sympathy for mankind, a
fairness, good will, and impartiality of spirit and judgment. Therefore, supporting one
side or the other violated Ameriea’s duty. Calling the war a disaster the country should
desire to avoid, he stressed the idea that the United States had no part or interest in
policies that appeared to have prompted the w a r.'"
While Wilson portrayed neutrality as sympathy for mankind, he acknowledged the
presenee of a self-serving element. In addition to altruistic motives, he supported
neutrality for how it could profit the country;
But I am interested in neutrality because there is something so much
greater to do than fight: there is a distinction waiting for this nation that

no nation has ever yet got. That is the distinction of absolute self-eontrol
and self-mastery...the self-mastered man who watehes you with calm eye
Address on Preparedness in Topeka, February 2, 1916, PW W . 36: 95.
Appeal to the American People, August 18, 1914, PW W . 30: 293-294; Remarks to the Associated Press
in New York, April 20, 1915, PW W . 33: 38; Annual Message on the State o f the Union, December 7, 1915,
PW W . 35: 294.
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and comes in only when you have carried the thing so far that you must be
disposed of...that is the man you respect...Now, I covet for America this
splendid courage of reserve moral force.
He presented neutrality as enabling the United States to achieve a moral level of respect.
This respect empowered the country to serve other nations by forging peace, which
allowed the formation of constitutional, republican governments that moved nations and
the world closer to God. He emphasized the special role America had to play, thinking
knowledge of this role prompted support for neutrality. Speaking of neutrality as a
general policy, Wilson stressed the impartiality of any U.S. action. The country had no
part in the war, and routinely avoided such conflicts. According to Wilson, the United
States had a duty to prevent the expansion of conflict and needed to save its strength,
“ ...for the anxious and difficult days of restoration and healing which must follow, when
peace will have to build its house anew.” ' " He proposed that the solution to the war was
a peace based on a society of nations where only the violation of the rights of man
deserved violent response. He claimed that Europe was beginning to understand that
America was saving itself to participate in an organization for peace."''
When he focused on specific policy efforts, such as relief services or arms sales,
audiences heard that neutrality governed all relations. Arms sales were an appropriate
and even necessary action for a neutral country to take. According to Wilson, if neutrals
did not sell arms, then one side could use stockpiled weapons or peacetime munitions
manufacturing gains to achieve an advantage. This situation could lead to the spread of

Remarks to the Associated Press in New York, April 20, 1915, PW W . 33: 40.
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militarism, which he opposed. Wilson argued that the circumstances forced him to
approve the sales of arms to both sides.’' ’

Foreign Policy Principles - Europe
Shortly after the war began, Wilson started outlining a general foreign policy for
Europe. When he spoke to Congress in 1914, he pointed out that Europe would soon
need the assistance of the United States, in a manufacturing and commercial sense.
America was not ready to mobilize its resources to aid Europe; therefore, the solution
was to focus on America first, so that Europe could be aided when the need arose.’"
Assistance for either side of the European conflict required principles and ideals to
guide decision-making. Wilson explained to audiences that the roots of the war were
obscure. He claimed America had to know why it was fighting, or the country would not
fight. Only the rights of mankind, not territory or national ambition, satisfied American
principles. No one knew what had started the war, according to Wilson, which
complicated the situation. Part of the problem was that Europeans carried out foreign
relations in secret, while Americans worked in the open. Both the Europeans in war and
the Americans in peace were grappling with different national standards, traditions, and
political systems. Wilson told his listeners that the war in Europe was a process by which
national elements were moving from conflict to cooperation by G od’s Providence, and
implied that this war was the final one in the process.’"
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Peace and the League of Nations
Before the beginning of war in Europe, Wilson presented America as a nation on the
front lines of the pursuit of peace through negotiations. Once the war began, he told the
country in a Thanksgiving proclamation that the nation had enjoyed an honorable peace
with those at war, and understood more deeply the benefits of peace. The United States
was at peace with all because the country was the champion of peace. He was a
persistent friend of peace, and only unmistakable necessity would lead him to change his
position. Wilson spoke of peace as more of a test of whether a nation knew how to
conduct its foreign relations than a test of p atien ce.'"
Wilson made a major effort for a peaceful resolution of the war before American
involvement through his peace note of December 18, 1916. When he explained what
prompted this measure, he revealed that he feared civilization would suffer permanent
damage if he failed to act. In order to pursue peace, the neutral nations needed specific
information from the combatants concerning acceptable conditions to end the war.
Wilson claimed he was not offering to mediate again as he had before the war in 1913
and 1914, and after the war began in 1914. “Let me say, in order that there may be no
danger of any misunderstanding, that I am not renewing or seeking to press my offer of
mediation made at the outset of the war.” ' " His note’s goal was to assist the warring
parties by asking for definite criteria for peace, and an agreement to form a league of
nations after the war. As he related to one audience, he thought the American people
wanted the U.S. government to determine the immediate interests of the belligerents and
support the formation of an association to guarantee free trade, territory, and political
Annual M essage to Congress, December 2, 1913, PW W . 29: 3; Thanksgiving Proclamation, October 28,
1914, PW W . 31: 241; Remarks at Union Station in Toledo, Ohio, July, 10, 1916, PW W , 37: 396.
Draft of a Peace Note, November 25, 1916, PW W . 40: 73.
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rights. In his famous “Peace Without Victory” speech on January 22, 1917, he defined
peace as a peace between equals, in which neither side dominated the other, and the
victor did not impose peace terms on the vanquished. Only a peace between equals
would last. Although he admitted he inferred that the warring nations wanted such a
peace, he felt confident that peace discussions were more likely than ever before, due to
the peace note and the subsequent responses.’"
Part of W ilson’s peace plan involved the creation of a league of nations. After the
war, neutrality would be impossible; the answer was to covenant with other nations to
prevent wars of aggression. In a 1916 campaign address in Indianapolis, he argued that
America’s duty when the war ended was to join some kind of league for ensuring a just
basis for peace, liberty, and merit based competition. As much as he desired both the
creation of such an organization and American participation in it, Wilson reminded his
audience that individual sentiment, and not national policy, best ensured world peace:
“The peace of the world is not going to be assured by the compact of nations, but by the
sympathies of men.” ’" Wilson thought the league concept was an important part of what
the American people wanted in a lasting peace settlement. The United States performing
its God-given duty would result in the creation of the league. Once foreign individuals
embraced the ideals he promoted, the governments formed by the consent of the
governed would create a peaceful, democratic international community. Wilson claimed

Draft of a Peace Note, November 25, 1916, PW W . 40: 70, 74; Address in Washington to the League to
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a community of power could create what a balanee of power could not - a lasting
peace.
Wilson asserted that the United States would partieipate in any feasible assoeiation to
seeure fundamental rights. Because of the ehanges in international relations brought
about by the war, a new diplomaey was required, based on the impartial justice of nations
banded together. He thought that America had always believed in this ideal for justiee,
even though the eountry had not always followed such a model. Wilson elaimed that the
United States stood ready once the war ended to lend the support of its full moral and
physical force to a league of nations to ensure world peaee. He wanted the entire world
to know the United States was willing to use its foree to preserve peaee in the interests of
mankind. After describing the league eoncept in Indianapolis, he said:
We have seen to it that America kept her poise when all the rest of the world
seemed to have lost its poise. Only upon the terms of retaining that poise and
using the splendid force, whieh always eomes with poise, ean we hope to play the
beneficent part in the history of the world which I have just now intimated.
By adding their authority and power to that of other nations, the people of the United
States could guarantee peace and justiee. Wilson asserted that Ameriea should support
the organization fully without regard for U.S. interests.

Business and Industry
Wilson viewed the role of business and industry as an important part of U.S. foreign
policy for Europe. The war eonvinced him that the w ay business functioned had changed
Address in Indianapolis, October 12, 1916, PW W . 38: 418; Nonpartisan Address in Cincinnati, October
26, 1916, PWW, 38: 541; Address to the Senate, January 22, 1917, PWW, 40: 536.
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forever. The U.S. business community needed wider, more international horizons. He
thought the war gave one great lesson to American business. The importance of
economic cooperation and coordination equaled the importance of military cooperation
and coordination. Since Wilson believed that after the war, Europe would need the
economic assistance of America, he justified maintaining the nation’s neutrality to keep
non-military industry alive during the war.’"^’
W ilson’s principles compelled him to accept the idea that war problems and peace
problems were really the same economically. He proclaimed to an audience that free,
constant, unthreatened trade was essential to a lasting peace. The key to peace and
prosperity in his mind was service. Keeping the United States at peace gave an infinite
prospect for prosperity, not from profiting on suffering, but from opportunities to serve
the world. Wilson stressed that America had to support service in trade and industry. He
insisted the U.S. government must require fair and even-handed commercial dealings
around the world, because the peace and ordered life of the world ultimately depended on
those trade conditions.''*^
When Wilson was describing the task of peace for a neutral nation, he used the term
“conquest” to explain the business atmosphere of that nation. He told an audience that
the country should have, “ ...abusiness that looks out upon all the world to make peaceful
conquest of every field of legitimate endeavor.” *'*^ He portrayed the conquest of foreign
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markets in a peaceful and honorable way as a reasonable ambition for American business.
Elsewhere, Wilson referred to business as the conquest of the world. Given the qualifiers
he attaehed to business conquest, such as peaceful and honorable, a more militant or
oppressive interpretation of W ilson’s business views appears strained.*'*'*
Wilson predicted that after the war financial and industrial advances would provide
the United States with a new role in world affairs. The scale of that role exceeded
anything known before, and U.S. markets were to serve mankind. Despite rapid changes
in the world making the nature of business unpredictable, America clearly had
unprecedented opportunities and greatly increased responsibilities. To subject the world
to America’s peaceful service, the nation needed to understand the world, comprehending
that domestic business problems were actually international business problems. Wilson
explained that the country’s duty of financial mediation obligated the nation to support
only open and fair business that advanced the interests of mankind. To fail to do so
might result in a trade war, which he claimed was far more dangerous to the peace than
armed war. Whether or not the country wanted to become involved in the affairs of other
countries politically, U. S. business had a great part to play in the world. He claimed that
cool judgment would put the nation in a position to use its financial resources to move
into an even more desirable position. In an address to the Grain Dealers’ National
Association in 1916, Wilson summed up his views on business when he told the group
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that mutual confidence and understanding formed the real wealth of foreign relationships,
and connections of this type created a spiritual nexus that was the essence of trade.

Preparedness
Although Wilson focused on peace and the formation of a league of nations as goals
for U.S. foreign policy, as the war continued he recognized the necessity of preparing the
nation for possible involvement. Preparedness became the domestic foreign policy focus.
The preparedness debate started shortly after the war began in 1914, and Wilson initially
opposed preparedness, thinking it aggressive and unnecessary. Theodore Roosevelt and
several professional military men disagreed with the pacifist direction in which Wilson
led the country. These men advocated immediate increases in the U.S. military. Wilson
condemned the disturbance caused by preparedness advocates in his Annual Message to
Congress in December, 1914. Despite efforts by Representative Augustus Gardner and
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the administration effectively quashed the initial
preparedness movement. Two organizations, the National Security League and the
American Legion, attempted to keep preparedness before the public eye, without much
success until the Lusitania crisis. As Arthur S. Link described it, “Almost overnight a
faltering movement became a crusade.” *'*^
Some historians have suggested Wilson publicly began supporting his own version of
preparedness at this point to prevent jingoes from controlling the movement. However,
Nonpartisan Address in Cincinnati, October 26, 1916, PW W . 38: 539, 541; Address in Baltimore to the
Grain Dealers’ National Association, September 25, 1916, PW W . 38: 263-264, 269; Address in Detroit to
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Wilson claimed he followed the desires of the majority, and the shift in his policy
reflected the public shift on preparedness. Link, Thomas J. Knock, and Kendrick A.
Clements agree that Wilson opposed preparedness until the sinking of the Lusitania in
May of 1915. However, in his Annual Message to Congress on December 8, 1914,
Wilson referred to training the citizenry, apart from the U.S. Army. Knock in particular
assigns this reference to the National Guard, but the context suggests another possibility.
After pointing out the wisdom of a system to train citizens in the use of modern arms, the
basics of drilling and maneuvering, and maintaining a clean camp, Wilson recommended
such training as beneficial, even if only for the health benefits. In the same paragraph he
observed;
Lvery means by which such things can be stimulated is legitimate, and
such a method smacks of true American ideals. It is right, too, that the
National Guard of the States should be developed and strengthened by
every means which is not inconsistent with our obligations to our own
people or with the established policy of our Government.*'*^
Wilson referred to the National Guard for the first time as an additional thought after he
completed his suggestion of a non-army force. His description of the trained citizenry
was virtually identical to the plan he espoused during his preparedness speaking tour in
January and Lebruary of 1916. By laying this option as a course of action before
Congress, Wilson seems to have considered preparedness in something other than a
negative light before his annual address in 1914.*'***
By autumn of 1915 Wilson was publicly speaking in favor of preparedness. He
defined preparedness to one group as preparing for defense and not war. Moderation was

An Annual M essage to Congress, December 8, 1914, PWW. 31:423.
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the key. Too much and the country ran toward militarism; too little and the country
would be defenseless. According to Wilson, the way to prepare for war was to prepare
for peace. The danger in preparedness lay in not knowing what to do with the force
raised.**^
Not all of America agreed with W ilson’s decision to support preparedness. Several
anti-preparedness leaders met with him on May 8, 1916, after his preparedness tour.
They adopted arguments Wilson had used, such as appealing to the spirit of America to
justify their position and suggesting the nations’ moral force suffered. According to
these leaders, his preparedness policy threatened to move the country down the road
toward militarism. In answering the anti-preparedness leaders, he used many elements
from his tour speeches. He disagreed with their conclusions, describing their fears as
unreasonable. He claimed that his policy was based on his correct understanding of
America. Wilson declared he proposed only reasonable preparation and not militarism.
“So, 1 don’t need to tell you that 1 am just as much opposed to militarism as any man
living. 1 think it is a deadly thing to get it into the spirit of a nation. And 1 don’t think
there is the slightest danger of its getting into the spirit of this nation...” *^** To another
audience, he later distinguished between a military spirit, in which one recognized the
need for a controlled military, and a militaristic spirit or militarism, in which one
attempted to have the military dominate national life. Wilson suggested that those with a
militaristic spirit were not truly American.’^*
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The Preparedness Tour
Given W ilson’s views on public speaking, the more he spoke on a topic, the more
important that topic was to him and the country. In his two terms as president, he only
went on speaking tours twice: for preparedness and for the League fight. Since the
League tour covered more cities and he spoke more times, it could be argued that the
League tour constituted his most important speeches. Many historians view his speeches
on the tour as the best he delivered. Several factors militate against considering that
effort W ilson’s finest speeches. He was exhausted from the Paris Conference, and he
plunged without rest into the League fight. As the League speaking tour went on, his
health declined to the point that his physician cut the tour short. Before the end of the
tour, several speeches showed the effects of his declining health as he left out lines and
repeated himself. To see Wilson at his best on a speaking tour, unaffected by the drains
of war, the peace conference, and treaty negotiation, one must examine the preparedness
tour.*^"
All W ilson’s preparedness speeches contained a common core. He explained why he
was speaking at the particular venue; the bases, methods and timing of preparedness; the
three major principles that served as the foundation of his plan; the elements of his plan;
the role of business; the role of the country, partisanship, and world circumstances.
Wilson spoke formally in nine cities, and in some cities to overflow meetings. He made
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comments on some train platforms along the way, and gave a talk to a business group in
St. Louis.
When Wilson toured the country speaking on preparedness, he often referred to his
task as conferring with the people. He said that his supreme duty was to speak to them;
otherwise, he would have remained in Washington. Compelled by conscience, he had
come to confer with the people and report to them concerning the chief issues. People
were interested in candid discussions of preparedness and he had come to speak about
crucial issues concerning the national welfare. Wilson informed his listeners, “I didn’t
come out to find out how you felt or what you thought, but to tell you what was going
on.” *^^ He was not there to find out opinions but to clarify events for them. He claimed,
" ...I want you to know the motives of what is proposed and the character of what is
proposed, in order that we should have only one attitude and counsel with regard to this
great matter.” '^'*
Wilson had specific expectations for the outcome of his speeches, and informed his
audiences what they were to do. He wanted his listeners to become active advocates of
the plan he outlined. Although Wilson did not specifically address readers of the
newspaper accounts of his speeches, he likely expected the same outcome. He warned
the people to distrust newspaper and editorial opinions, as he did, because the opinions
reflected the thoughts of a small group, not the majority. One of the reasons for the
speaking tour was to eonnect with the people directly and explain his views clearly and
simply, independent of newspaper interpretation.*^^
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Early in the tour, Wilson admitted he had changed his mind about preparedness,
which was now a subject of deep emotion for him. He claimed he could not express his
own opinion, but remained constrained to neutrality in spirit, thought and deed in order to
express the nation’s views rather than his own. Wilson reminded listeners of his constant
efforts to hear the voice of the country, or govern according to the wishes of the silent
majority. He spoke not to excite, but to stimulate the sense of responsibility in his
hearers. The spirit of the people concerning this matter, their support of preparedness as
a concept, was not in question. Wilson knew the spirit before he began the tour.
... [The people at the speech] only express the spirit of the nation. They do not
express the organized force of the nation. And, while I know, and knew before I
left Washington, what the spirit of the people was, I have come out to ask them
what their organization is and what they intend to make it.’^*’
By “organization”, Wilson referred to the people’s willingness to support a specific type
of preparedness, preferably his version. Wilson claimed he appealed to the people not
out of any sense of doubt concerning his own conclusions about the nation’s opinion, but
to give the country the satisfaction of unified utterance. The large turnout reflected the
great interest of the nation in the question of preparedness. According to Wilson, the
audience sizes also showed the people’s support for what he was saying, since they came
to support his cause and not merely to see a president.
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Wilson told his audience he was driven by a desire for peaee, whieh could be assured
by having right and honor as guiding prineiples for American thought and action. He
explained his preparedness efforts were not an attempt to stir up a military spirit in the
nation. Instead, he sought efficiency: “Therefore, I, for my part, have a great enthusiasm
for rendering America spiritually efficient, and that conception lies at the basis of what
seems very far removed from it, namely the plans that have been proposed for the
military efficieney of this n a t i o n . W i l s o n talked about the intangible and invisible as
he spoke about preparation for national defense. He reported that he had tried to make
war impossible for the United States, but he did not know if war would be coming.
According to Wilson, people did not make war; governments did. His job was to make
sure that everyone respected American rights. Preparedness gave him the means to
ensure this respect.
Wilson explained the bases of preparedness. He did not base the need for
preparedness on war or peace, or a sudden change in national circumstances. He was
merely interpreting the spirit of America. The country believed greater measures for
national defense were necessary. Additionally, he argued that the nature of war had
changed. Armies fought wars scientifically, and the scope of war led to cataclysmic
upheaval. If inaction left the eountry unprotected and thereby endangered from potential
threats, then the national life would be worthless. Wilson cited two reasons the nation
needed to be prepared to use force: first, to vindieate the right of Americans to the
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protection of international law, and second, to safeguard the right to sell in open, neutral
markets.*^"
The timing and means of preparedness were as important as the bases. Wilson
suggested moving in stages rather than attempting any sudden changes. He also did not
wish to hurry Congress. At the same time, the nation could not afford to postpone action,
because any future needs and dangers were unknown. Only work in stages consistent
with national prineiples met with W ilson’s approval. The work required peace as its
purpose, not profits. Undoubtedly some people and eompanies would make money from
preparedness, but he stressed many times that national defense should not be an exeuse
for munition manufacturers to make money. If privately made munitions proved too
expensive, he promised the government would manufacture its own.'^*
Wilson emphasized three major foreign poliey principles that preparedness better
equipped the United States to defend and preserve. The first was national sovereignty,
which he described as freedom from external military eontrol and influenee. The second
was the right and ability of a eountry’s people to determine the government of their
nation free from outside interference. The third was the need to stand as strong brothers
with like-minded eountries of the Western Hemisphere. In virtually every speech,
Wilson gave his listeners heard some variation of these three prineiples as the
foundational ideas of preparedness. He stressed that these principles contained the spirit
of the United States, which America was obligated to keep and enforce. With the
Monroe Doctrine as the country’s pledge to the world of these ideas, Wilson sought to
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apply these ideas to the entire world, describing them as the higher rights of mankind,
and sentiments of the heart that desired peace.
Wilson had a particular plan that he proposed at each stop on the tour. He
demonstrated why the country needed his plan when he reviewed the status of standing
U.S. forces. The navy was actually in sound condition, but it needed expanding to keep
up with changes in naval technology. Improvements also would help the navy better
represent the United States and ensure the country could maintain its various
responsibilities. The Coast Guard’s situation corresponded to that of the navy. American
land forces were another story altogether, since the army’s small numbers prevented the
performance of its functions. If called on to do more, such as fight in Europe, the army
could not meet the need. America’s lack of imperialistic ambition and peaceful relations
with the world made a large standing army unnecessary, and such an army might create a
danger of militarism. The only other option in addition to W ilson’s plan was the National
Guard. He cited three specific reasons why the Guard would not meet the needs of
preparedness. Eirst, the function of the Guard, to respond to invasion, was different from
that of the regular army. Second, the National Guard was state related, not federal, so
only governors, not presidents could call them into action. Third, the Guard was too
small to be of significant use. W ilson’s reasoning left only one option, his plan.*^^
As he had told Congress in his December 1914 annual address, the plan involved
training a group of citizens apart from the U.S. Army and the National Guard, to
supplement the army when needed. The training also was to involve the use of arms and
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drilling maneuvers. He expanded on his original idea when he spoke on the tour, and
added the idea of training members of industry and business as well. Wilson told his
listeners that he had advised Congress to approve his plan:
...I am counseling the Congress of the United States not to take the adviee of
those who recommend that we should have, and have very soon, a great standing
army, but, on the contrary, to see to it that the eitizens of this country are so
trained, and that the military equipment is so sufficiently provided for them, that,
when they ehoose, they can take up arms and defend themselves."^'*
His focus was on using young volunteers and training them as a reserve force. By
making the training short-term, the men could work and live about three quarters of the
time in their normal lives, and retain all the ideals of citizens. This meant a large number
of men could be trained and made ready, without ereating a large standing army or a
spirit of militarism like that found in Europe. Wilson suggested only a short period of
training would be needed, because American men already knew how to fight. They just
needed training in modern weapons, tactics, and other aspects of scientific war fought
according to army procedures. He told audienees his plan put men in a position to care
for the country if the need arose. His plan demonstrated the difference between operating
the nation on a military basis, and preparing men to vindicate the national honor as
required.
Wilson also addressed economics and business as they related to preparedness.
America was the source of ideals-based economic guidance for the rest of the world. As
such, the country had the opportunity to assume a new, international business position.
During the war, the United States had been practicing peaceful commerce with nations on
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both sides. Wilson asserted that America could better serve the warring nations by
staying out of the conflict and giving economic aid. He argued the country had a moral
obligation to stay out of the war, but also had a moral obligation to ensure the free course
of commerce and finance, which were rights America stood ready to vindicate. Wilson
also pointed out that business needed to mobilize for national defense. The equipment
and other needs of his plan meant business and industry had a preparedness duties to
perform in support of America’s role.’*^^
Wilson described U.S. principles and responsibilities that governed the nation’s task
during the preparedness tour. He told his listeners that although the nation was pro
peace, it loved principles more than peace. America was unique in its desire to serve
justice, righteousness, and peace. In Topeka he declared: “This is the final test of the
validity, the strength, the irresistible force of the American ideal.” *^’ He described the
United States as champions of freedom, noting other nations often called on the country
to exert moral influence. According to Wilson, the destiny of America was an ideal
destiny to declare and stand for the rights of men.*^*
Wilson believed that America’s ability to fulfill its destiny lay in part in its nature.
The country honored self-sacrifice, and was unafraid of adversaries. Critical to the
nation’s achievement of its destiny was the composite nature of the people. Most
immigrants had a love of liberty as strong as that of the native born. He told his
audiences that peace was at the heart o f the agricultural and industrial populations.
Wilson made a special point to note that despite reports to the contrary, Kansas and the
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Midwest in general were not indifferent to national defense. He approved of this
situation, as the people there and all across the nation needed to support preparedness and
be preparing.*®
Despite the peaee-loving nature and principles of the country, Wilson told his
audiences there were limits on peace. Some proponents of peace were willing to have
peace at any cost. Unlike those people, Wilson argued that peace was not worth the loss
of a people’s self-respect. Because peace was dependent on other countries, he could not
guarantee that war would never come. The United States had to be prepared for any
situation. “America can’t afford to be weak, and she can’t afford to use her strength for
anything which does not honor the Stars and Stripes.” *™ Wilson explained that America
was not isolated from the world, which made ignoring the rest of the world impossible.
He suggested isolationists needed to answer the question, “Can you control events
outside the country?” Keeping the peace required more than favorable opinion to stop
warfare. It required preparedness.*^*
Wilson did not leave his audience without any sense of a role, duty, or task for the
nation. America needed to assert principles in a world where those prineiples had broken
down. Because of the war, the world was in chaos. The United States could keep order
while the world burned, and better serve the combatants by remaining at peace and
preserving the foundations of life. He feared that if the country became involved in the
insanity of the war, then America would lose its perspective and thereby its chance to
redeem the world. According to Wilson, the United States had a desire to maintain its
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status as the trustee of moral judgment for the world, and that desire was the only sense in
which the country’s actions should be considered based on self-interest.*^^
Although W ilson’s preparedness tour speeches focused on principles and generalized
plans, he did make occasional specific reference to other foreign relations of the United
States. He pointed out that the country’s history had no precedent for involvement in
European wars. Traditionally the nation avoided such entangling alliances, and in the
early twentieth century, America was more interested in peace rather than in European
involvement. Wilson cited American involvement in Cuba and the Spanish-CubanAmerica War as evidence to foreign nations that the United States loved liberty. *^^
Although America loved liberty, Wilson thought that too many people became caught
up in partisan or prejudiced enthusiasm. This emotional response led to rash action that
the country wanted to avoid. The United States needed to be guided by self-possessed
thought. According to Wilson, the silent majority was cool and collected, not ruled by
passion. The silent citizens needed to speak up and make their voices heard, since
guiding national policy by passion was unwise. Those passions made the United States a
generous nation, but Wilson argued that it was necessary to be on guard for flare-ups:
What you have to realize is that everywhere throughout America there is
combustible material - combustible in our breasts...W e have got to be on our
guard, and it has been our hourly and daily anxiety in Washington to see that the
exposed tinder was covered up and the sparks prevented from falling where there
were magazines.*™
He emphasized that those advocating division along national lines and prompting war
were not representative of the majority. Often the loudest voices in the preparedness
controversy were the irresponsible ones. Wilson stressed that preparedness was not a
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partisan issue, and regretted that the preparedness debate had taken place during an
election year. He suggested that all party differences should fall away and Americans
stand united.’™
Wilson referred to world circumstances as he spoke about the need for preparedness.
He said the entire world, except South America, was involved in the war. As a result, the
rest of the world was undergoing significant changes. He described the events as
something that would transform the history of the world in unprecedented ways. Wilson
pointed out the need for the United States to increase its rate of military and industrial
improvements to keep pace with changing world events. America needed to begin
immediately, because it was possible that there was not enough time to prepare: “All the
world outside of America is on fire.” '^^ Wilson assured his audiences that he was trying
to preserve the peace and honor of the United States, but circumstances could render the
preservation of both impossible. No one wanted peace on this basis. He explained that
the United States might have to use force to maintain its honor. The country’s
willingness to fight only for its honor helped other nations believe that America was a
champion of humanity and the rights of men. According to Wilson, this belief prompted
other nations to turn to the United States as a source of moral judgment. The country
earnestly desired this role, and by virtue of its peaceful stance, the United States was
more indispensable than ever before.’™
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Final Speeches
Having examined W ilson’s speeches from his first term inauguration in March of
1913 to the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany on January 31,
1917, only a few addresses remain before U.S. entry into World W ar I. In February, he
spoke to a joint session of Congress about the severing of diplomatic ties with Germany.
In March, he released a brief statement to the press about the Senate filibuster, and gave
his second inaugural speech. On April 2, he called for war in an address to a joint session
of Congress.
After Germany changed its submarine warfare strategy, Wilson suspended diplomatic
relations. He addressed a joint session of Congress, giving the “Peace Without Victory”
speech. Once he had related the background information concerning prior conflicts and
agreements, the violation by Germany, and the response of the United States, he
explained his anticipated outcome to Congress. Wilson was convinced that even though
the United States had severed diplomatic relations, Germany would not actually go so far
as to practice unrestricted submarine warfare: “Only actual overt acts on their part can
make me believe it even now.”™^ He explained that he would not consider Germany
hostile until it proved otherwise. What the United States required of Germany was not
unreasonable. America had no selfish ends, and desired only the reasonable defense of
its citizen’s rights. After this address, he expected the support of Congress for his plans,
but eleven members of the Senate filibustered until the end of the session and blocked

Address to a Joint Session of Congress, February 3, 1917, PW W . 41 : 111. “It” referred to German use
o f unrestricted submarine warfare.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84

W ilson’s legislative requests. In a statement released to the press, he charged that the
Senate had hindered the progress of U.S foreign relations.’™
The day after the press statement, the eountry inaugurated Wilson as president for a
second term. He informed the audienee that the United States had been drawn into
international affairs despite the eountry’s desire to remain uneneumbered. He mentioned
three points that specifically related to the erisis at hand. Armed neutrality was the only
option open to the United States other than war, and to remain true to the nation’s
principles such an option had to be tried before deelaring war. He emphasized that all
U.S. aetions were rooted in prineiples too dear and fundamental to be altered, and that
America had no desire for conquest or advantage. Wilson also acknowledged that the
United States had been violated: “We have been deeply wronged upon the seas, but we
have not wished to wrong or injure in return; have retained throughout the eonsciousness
of standing in some sort apart, intent upon an interest that transcended the immediate
issues of the war itself.” ’^” He relied on the hope that in God’s Providenee the eountry
and world could be purged of faetions and divisions, and stand together on behalf of the
dignity of mankind. Stressing his perception of his job as that of the people’s servant,
Wilson asserted that only the confidence and counsel of the people could sustain and
guide him .’*’
Little less than a month later, Wilson gave his final pre-war speech on April 2, 1917,
to a joint session of Congress. While calling for war, he expressed amazement at the
willingness of Germany to use unrestricted submarine warfare. Denouncing this tactic as
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war against mankind and all the nations, he stipulated the principles that governed the
necessary U.S. response. He had thought that defending neutral rights with arms was
sufficient to protect U.S. citizens, but that method had proved ineffectual. Wilson
expressed to his audience the conviction that neutrality was now impossible. The only
remaining options were submission or defense of U.S. principles through war. The
former was clearly not acceptable. To clarify American intentions, he asserted that in
going to war against Germany, “Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious
assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human
right, of which we are only a single champion.” '*" Peace after the war could only be
realized by a partnership of democratic nations, and only free nations could form such a
partnership. Wilson reminded Congress that in going to war the United States had no
desire for conquest, gain, or dominion, but wanted to make the world safe for democracy
by planting peace on the foundation of political liberty.'**

Conclusion
Wilson shared many aspects of foreign policy principles and decisions with his
audiences. He explained the decision making process and the types of information he
needed to make decisions. He also addressed the largely negative impact of politics and
elections on foreign relations.
The principles of foreign policy that Wilson discussed included the critical
importance of government established by the free consent of the governed. America’s
duty to serve other nations by advancing peace, democracy, and free trade was rooted in
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its unique spiritual relationship with the world. He told audiences that the Monroe
Doctrine provided the cooperative understanding necessary for the United States to
selflessly aid other nations. U.S. imperialism differed from the Europeans, since U.S.
actions were neither aggressive nor oppressive, but entirely benevolent.
Wilson explained the necessity of neutrality in the face of war in Europe. By
remaining neutral, he hoped to mediate a peace based in part on the nation’s unique
ability to see both sides by virtue of a melting pot population. Neutrality also enabled
America to retain moral influence with foreign nations, something Wilson greatly
desired. He spoke of the need to engage in military trade with both sides as the duty of a
neutral nation.
The primary principle of U.S. foreign relations with war-torn Europe was peace.
Wilson reminded his listeners that the reasons for the war were obscure, and America had
a record of non-involvement with European affairs. His goal with Europe was peace. He
portrayed America as a champion of peace, and suggested the need for a formal
organization to ensure peace after the war. He was convinced that future neutrality was
impossible for the United States due to changes in the nation’s international role and
involvement. Further changes in the nature of war prompted him to suggest the only
means of guaranteeing peace lay in an international body that upheld American
principles. To Wilson, those principles also were the world’s.
As the war dragged on and the likelihood of the United States becoming involved
grew, Wilson publicly endorsed preparation for national defense. He stressed that the
country preferred peace, but not at the cost of national honor. He proposed a plan to
create a large group of trained men while avoiding the risk of militarism with a huge
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standing army. He went on one of two speaking tours during his presidency to promote
his preparedness plan. Given his views of public speaking, this tour marked the most
significant foreign policy issue of his first term.
After Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in February of 1917,
W ilson’s few speeches focused on his efforts to avoid war. He explained that he did not
believe Germany would use such tactics. However, in his final speech calling for war, he
conceded that every possible step to prevent war had failed. He called for the United
States to use force and go to war for the restoration of human rights.
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CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION
The primary source of W ilson’s ideology was his religion. From his earliest
childhood, Christian concepts dominated his worldview, and shaped the principles he
applied to the presidency and foreign relations. Although his Presbyterianism shaped
much of his expression of religion, his father’s overall influence reigned supreme. The
importance of oratory in W oodrow’s life also can be traced to his father. To
underestimate the impact of W ilson’s father on his ideology results in a major misreading
of the most significant shaping influence on W ilson’s thoughts and values.
As an adult, Wilson held strongly to the religion of his youth. While he admitted to
contradictory elements in his personal theology, his overall religious viewpoint fit well
with the northern Presbyterian church in which he was a ruling elder. His viewpoint
required action as the logical conclusion to religious beliefs. He understood patriotism
and support for one’s country as similar to religious duty, blurring the lines separating
religion and patriotism. By linking these concepts, Wilson made service to the country a
religious obligation.
Wilson described a new role for the United States in international affairs, based on
ideals and principles. This study shows that many of the principles he espoused had
religious roots. When he explained the character and function of good leaders, those men
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needed biblical faith, and worked to bring the country, or world, closer to God. Political
leadership fundamentally meant conduct that glorified God. Oratory, critical for a leader,
was persuasive, much like preaching. When Wilson defined America’s duty, he depicted
carrying out the plan of Divine Providence to spread the blessings of American-style
democracy to the world. Because it rested on religious grounds, American policy and
actions by definition benefited mankind, even if others did not agree.
When Wilson focused on foreign policy examples, his ideology dictated how he
understood U.S. actions. Imperial actions on the part of the nation became efforts to
uplift people and foster democratic government. He cited Cuba, the Philippines, and
Puerto Rico as products of this motivation. He justified much of his Mexico policy by
relating U.S. action, or the lack thereof, to varying expressions of constitutional
government. Through supporting what to his mind was legitimate government in
Mexico, he hoped to encourage the Mexican people to form an American style
democratic government and further God’s plans.
Wilson was not reticent about expressing his principles. He pursued his vision of a
good leader and engaged in oratory frequently. In his speeches, he explained U.S. policy
and actions in terms of principles. The influence of his religion extended beyond
principles to use as religious concepts and references to further his agenda. His language
blurred the line between the sacred and secular. References to “interpreting the spirit”
took on multiple meanings, and he used “spirit” in both religious and non-religious
contexts. He often used Bible references to illustrate principles he was discussing. The
culture at the time possessed a significant amount of popular religious knowledge,
making references an easy tool to clarify meanings.
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The governing principles Wilson described in specific foreign policies also reflected
religious influences. When he explained the need for U.S. neutrality at the beginning of
war in Europe, his objective was to allow America to mediate the peace. He described
peace as exerting a healing and elevating influence in the world. The ultimate goal was
to raise the nations up to God, and peace was the means to that goal. W ilson’s principle
idea to perpetuate peace was an organization of nations. He thought changes in warfare
and in America’s higher international profile made neutrality after the w ar’s end
impossible. The United States needed to join an organization that would protect the
rights of men to self-government and unhindered trade.
W ilson’s regular use of oratory, both before and during his presidency, reflected his
father’s high regard for public speaking and its relation to leadership. In W ilson’s view
of public speaking, the more important the issue, the greater the need to address it. The
best example of this concept is his speaking tour to support the Paris peace treaty and
League of Nations. If the League fight were the most important series of speeches
Wilson gave, then in the Wilson scale of importance, the preparedness speaking tour
addressed the most important issue in his first term as president.
In the preparedness tour, Wilson used all the elements common to his speeches to
describe a critical foreign policy need. He explained his plan and how it avoided the
militarism antagonistic to American principles. Business and industry were encouraged
to serve the nation by supporting preparedness. He urged the nation to embrace its
Providential duty of spreading democracy and free trade. He claimed his reasons for
pursuing his course of action derived from his sense of the American spirit, of which he
was merely a servant. Promoting the United States as a champion of peace, he presented
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preparedness as the logical policy for a country concerned with living up to its ideals and
principles.
W ilson’s final prewar speeches in February and March of 1917 further revealed his
dependence on his ideals and their religious basis. When faced with Germany’s
resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, Wilson refused to ask Congress to declare
war. His religious view of the essential goodness of man led him to conclude Germany
would not use the submarine tactic. After several attacks on neutral shipping, he relented
and called for war on April 2, 1917. The strength of his principles compelled him to ask
for a war to end all wars. Such a war would usher in a new age of peace, and America
could fulfill its duty of elevating mankind. Thus, W ilson’s religious beliefs informed the
principles he used to explain U.S. foreign relations to the people of America, and shaped
his policies throughout the period of American neutrality before W orld W ar I and after.
Historians have arrived at different conclusions when analyzing W ilson’s foreign
policy motives and actions. Some members of the realist school of American foreign
relations, emphasizing pragmatic concerns and balance of power issues, dismiss Wilson
as an idealistic fool who had no understanding of the real world. Others attempt to
attribute realist motives to W ilson’s actions. Tony Smith argued that the United States
supported democracies for national security reasons, not pietistic ones. Wilson cited
religious reasons to protect national security: to preserve America’s ability to support
democracy. Understanding the basis of W ilson’s principles places his emphasis on
national security in an idealistic, not a realistic, context.
New Left revisionists, basing their analysis on a perception of the United States as
imperialistic and acting from self-interest, viewed Wilson as an interventionist
184
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suppressing radicalism. While clearly active and intervening frequently, W ilson's
motives were based in his religious conviction of the supremacy of American style
democracy, and the attendant blessings of God to that form of government. His anti
radicalism stemmed more from his desire to uplift other nations rather than from
American self-interest, and he understood his imperialistic activities as conveying
Christian benefits, desired by all humanity. Later revisionists presented Wilson as a
virtual radical, appealing to the far left. If this were the case, then W ilson’s claims of
rigorously acting for the silent majority while ignoring minority groups constitute
outright lies of which the majority of the nation remained unaware. While his ideas may
have appealed to the far left, without the support of the majority none of W ilson’s
proposals would have been successful.’*^
Recent research has identified weakness in both the realist and revisionist approaches
to Wilson, and sought to place him at the beginning of the modem presidency’s struggle
to maintain a balance between the unifying effect of nationalism and the disconnecting
result of a global economy and various racial, ethnic, and religious divisions. Some using
this method have ignored or dismissed references to W ilson’s religious beliefs. Any
desire on W ilson’s part to engage in such a balancing act derived from his application of
his principles in accordance with his religious views. Appreciating W ilson’s religious
motivation aids in explaining his efforts to maintain stability against the backdrop of
nationalism and a global economy. His beliefs enabled him to weave in and out of the
contradictions of his ideals and deeds while preserving, to him, consistency in thought
and action. Thus, understanding the religious foundations of W ilson’s principles and his
David Steigerwald, “The Reclamation of W oodrow W ilson?” in Paths to Power: The Historiogranhv of
American Foreign Relations to 1941. Michael J. Hogan, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000), 154, 159.
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application of them explains how many of the conclusions of realist, revisionist, and
subsequent historians concerning Wilson are both contradictory and accurate.'*'’
Finally, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought issues of religion to the
forefront of American consciousness, particularly the power of religion to motivate acts
of profound significance in international relations. This study demonstrates that religion
has previously affected U.S. foreign relations and justified American actions. Religion
shapes U.S. policy today, and while George W. Bush may not express his beliefs as
Woodrow Wilson did. Bush’s religion affects his decisions. Every president has
professed some religious belief; until the nation elects an atheist, religion will continue to
influence U.S. foreign policy. As Woodrow W ilson’s presidency demonstrates, that
impact can be significant.

Steigerwald, “Reclamation”, 159, 163.
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